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of-use#LAATHE HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE  OF ARTICLE III
DANIEL J.  MELTZERt
In his present article and two that preceded it,'  Akhil Amar takes
issue with what has  come  to be regarded  as the traditional  view of
article III-that Congress  has  plenary  authority over  federal  court
jurisdiction.  According to that view, Congress may deprive the lower
federal courts,  the Supreme  Court, or all federal  courts of jurisdic-
tion over any cases within the federal judicial power, excepting only
those few that fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
2
Amar's powerful challenge to this tradition resembles two other
t  Professor  of  Law,  Harvard  University.  A.B.  1972,  J.D.  1975,  Harvard
University.  I am grateful  to Dick Fallon, Willy  Fletcher, Gerry Gunther, and  David
Shapiro for their encouragement and perceptive  comments, and to Matt Kreeger and
Sylvia Quast for helpful suggestions and  tireless research assistance.  Special thanks
go to Akhil  Amar, whose careful  and  probing criticism  saved me  from errors  and
clarified my own thinking, even though he did not quite convert me.
1 See Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original  Jurisdiction of  the Supreme Court, 56
U.  CHI.  L.  REv.  443  (1989)  [hereinafter  Amar,  Original  Jurisdiction];  Amar, A  Neo-
Federalist  Fiew ofArticle III:  Separating  the Two  Tiers of  FederalJurisdiction,  65 B.U.L. REv.
205 (1985)  [hereinafter  Amar, Neo-Federalist View].
2  See,  e.g.,  Bator, Congressional  Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27
VILL.  L.  REV.  1030,  1030-31  (1982);  Gunther,  Congressional Power to  Curtail Federal
Court  Jurisdiction: An Opinionated  Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN.  L. REV.  895, 901-
10  (1984);  Redish,  Congressional Power to  Regulate Supreme  Court Appellate Jurisdiction
Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal  and External  Examination, 27  VILL. L. REV.  900,
902  (1982)  [hereinafter  Redish,  Power  to  Regulate]; Wechsler,  The  Courts and the
Constitution, 65 COLUM.  L.  REV.  100o,  IAb5  (1965).  When discussing  constitutional
limits on congressional power, like Amar, I put to one side "external" limits based on
constitutional provisions  other than article III.
Professor Gunther, who wrote before Amar first addressed  this topic, has since
indicated that although he finds Amar's thesis powerful, and though Amar has forced
Gunther to rethink his position and has persuaded him that there is a stronger case to
be made for article III limits  on congressional  control, see G. Gunther, Remarks  at
Bicentennial  Conference  of First Judiciary  Act  (Sept.  21,  1989)  (on file  with  the
University of Pennsylvania Law  Review),  on balance  Gunther  still inclines towards  the
traditional view, see Letter from Gerald Gunther to DanielJ. Meltzer (Feb. 26,  1990)
(on file with the  University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
Amar occasionally  treats Henry Hart as a traditionalist, and sometimes associates
him with the views of the third edition of the Hart and Wechsler casebook, P. BATOR,
D.  MELTZER,  P. MISHKIN  & D.  SHAPIRO,  HART  &  WECHSLER'S  THE  FEDERAL COURTS
AND  THE  FEDERAL  SYSTEM  (3d  ed.  1988)  [hereinafter  HART  & WECHSLER].  Hart
suggested, however,  that article III limits Congress's power to restrict the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction.  See Hart,  The  Power of Congress to Limit  the Jurisdiction  of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66  HARV.  L.  REV.  1362,  1364-65  (1953); see also infra
note  144.  The third edition neither endorses nor rejects Hart's views.
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recent arguments for limitations on congressional power under arti-
cle  III. In  1981,  Lawrence  Sager contended  that some federal  court,
Supreme or inferior, must  have jurisdiction  to  review  "state  court
decisions  that  repudiate  federal  constitutional  claims  of right."'
Sager rested in part on the importance of the tenure and salary pro-
tection that article III affords to all federaljudges.  Three years later,
Robert  Clinton argued  that  article  III  requires  that  some  federal
court  have  jurisdiction  over  all  cases  within  the  federal  judicial
power.4
In both of these accounts, the scope of mandatory jurisdiction is
problematic.  Sager's  focus on constitutional  claims  relating to fed-
eral  supremacy  is somewhat unpersuasive  when one recalls  that the
Constitution itself imposes few restraints on the states, and that dele-
gates  to  the Constitutional  Convention and  the state ratifying  con-
ventions  viewed  federal jurisdiction  as  most  vital  in actions  under
federal treaties and national revenue laws or in admiralty.5  Clinton's
virtually unlimited obligation is hard to square with the First Judici-
ary  Act  and  subsequent  congressional  legislation.'  Moreover,  his
3 Sager,  Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on  Congress' Authority  to  Regulate the
Jurisdiction  of the Federal  Courts, 95  HIAv.  L.  REV.  17,  44 (1981).
4  See  Clinton, A  Mandatory View of Federal Court  Jurisdiction:  A  Guided Quest  for the
Original Understanding of Article  III,  132  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  741,  753,  793-94  (1984)
[hereinafter Clinton, A  Guided Quest].  Clinton added  a  qualification:  Congress  may
"limit the mode of review  (i.e., review of facts) or... prevent misuse of federal judicial
resources by limiting trivial, insignificant,  or vexatious  appeals."  Id.  at 839-40.
5  See, e.g.,  3 THE  DEBATES  IN THE SEVERAL  STATE  CONVENTIONS  ON THE ADOPTION
OF  THE  FEDERAL  CoNsTrrrION  532  (J.  Elliot  ed.  1901)  [hereinafter  ELLIOT'S
DEBATES]  (remarks  of James  Madison);  4  id.  at  160,  164  (remarks  of William
Maclaine); infra text accompanying notes 30-52; see also 3J. STORY,  COMMENTARIES  ON
THE  CONsTrrtrrioN  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  §  1637,  at  505  (1833)  (stressing special
importance  of jurisdiction  over  ca:ses  arising under  treaties);  Redish,  Constitutional
Limitations on  Congressional Power to  Control Federal  Jurisdiction: A  Reaction  to Professor
Sager, 77 Nw. U.L. REV.  143,  152 (1982)  [hereinafter Redish, Constitutional  Limitations]
(noting that the salary and  tenure protection on which Sager relies applies  to all of
the federal judicial power, not just to constitutional  cases).
6  See Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of  the Judiciary  Act of 1789, 138 U.  PA. L.  REV.
1499,  1519-20  (1990).  In a subsequent article, Clinton struggles  to establish that the
First Judiciary  Act  was  largely  consistent  with  his  interpretation.  See  Clinton,  A
Mandatory View of Federal  Court  Jurisdiction: Early  Implementation of and Departures  from the
Constitutional Plan,  86  COLuM.  L.  REV.  1515  (1986)  [hereinafter  Clinton,  Early
Implementation].  But  in addition  to its jurisdictional  amount  limitations,  see Amar,
supra, at  1519-21,  the  Act  did  not  fully  vest  the  federal  judicial  power  in  other
important respects:
1.  State courts had concurrent jurisdiction over suits by the United States  and suits
between a state and  a  non-citizen.  There was  no express  provision  for removal  or
Supreme  Court review.  See also infra note  124  (discussing possibility  that Supreme
Court had implicit power to remove).
2.  Diversity jurisdiction  was limited by the  assignee clause,  and more significantlyHISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE III
prescription  in  diversity  cases  is  quite  awkward:  either  Congress
must give lower federal  courts exclusive jurisdiction  (or give  every
party in  every  diversity case  a right to invoke federal jurisdiction),"
despite  widespread  concerns  in  the  ratification  debates  about  any
exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction,8  or the Supreme Court must
review  state court decisions  on matters  of non-federal law.
Amar occupies a middle ground between Sager and Clinton.  He
argues  that  the federal judicial power  "must,  as  an  absolute  mini-
mum, comprehend the subject matter jurisdiction to decide finally all
cases involving federal questions, admiralty, or public ambassadors,"
and  "may-but need not-extend  to  cases  in  the six  other, party-
defined  jurisdictional  categories."'  Thus,  Congress's  obligation
under article III to assign jurisdiction to either the Supreme Court or
the lower  federal  courts reaches  beyond constitutional  claims  to  a
by the provision permitting removal only when the defendant was not a citizen of the
forum state. Again, there was no Supreme Court review of state court decisions.
In addition,  whether  or not "the  framers"  gave  any thought  to the  complete
diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806),  it is clear today
that the  statutory scope  of diversity jurisdiction  falls  far short of its  constitutional
scope.  Finally, Clinton's thesis, like Amar's, must account for the FirstJudiciary Act's
failure  fully  to  vest  jurisdiction  over  federal  question  cases,  cases  affecting
ambassadors  and other foreign  officials,  and  arguably  cases  in admiralty.  See infra
text accompanying  notes  55-103.
7 I assume here, and throughout this Article,  that a "mandatory"  theory would
permit a case to be actually litigated in state court without Supreme Court review, so
long as  all parties  had  the chance  to invoke  federal jurisdiction but instead  chose
state  court  adjudication.  For a  defense'  of that assumption  in  a  slightly different
context, see Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and  the Constitution, 76 IND.  LJ.
291, 301-04  (1990).
8  See infra note 48 and accompanying  text.
9  Amar, Neo-Federalist View,  supra note 1, at 229.  Amar's  division into  subject-
matter and party-based jurisdictions follows  that of ChiefJustice John Marshall.  See,
e.g.,  Cohens v.  Virginia,  19 U.S.  (6 Wheat.) 264,  378  (1821).
As Amar elaborates  in his reply, his thesis would not permit Congress to abolish
any of the nine jurisdictions in its entirety, but requires only that Congress must give
the federal  courts power to hear at least two controversies  in each case.  See Amar,
Reports of My  Death Are  Greatly Exaggerated: A  Reply,  138  U. PA.  L. REv.  1651,  1652
(990) [hereinafter Amar, Reply]; see also Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note  1, at 240
n.1 19  (stating that "arguably"  federal  courts  must have  that minuscule amount  of
party-based jurisdiction).
One of the so-called party-based jurisdictions-jurisdiction  when citizens of the
same  state  claim  lands  under  grants of different  states-is in  fact based  primarily
upon  subject matter (conflicting land grants);  the limitation  to parties of the same
state  is  beside the  point,  since  citizens  of different  states  would  in any  event  fall
within the  diversity jurisdiction.  This jurisdiction  does  have a party-based  flavor-
the  involvement  (as grantors rather than litigants) of two  different  states.  But the
jurisdiction affecting ambassadors and other diplomats, which Amar treats as subject-
matter based, has just as much of a party-based flavor.  In any event, for simplicity I
shall follow Amar's terminology.
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"mandatory  tier"  (containing three heads ofjurisdiction), but not to
the entire federal judicial power.
Amar's account is not, however, simply a compromise position.
It is rooted, first of all, in an interpretation of the Constitution's text.
Article III provides  that  the judicial power "shall be vested"  in the
Supreme Court and such lower courts as Congress  may create, and
"shall extend"  to nine categories of jurisdiction.  In the description
that  follows  of those nine categories,  the word  "all"  modifies  only
the first three.' °  Justice Story noted this textual variation in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee,1  but  thereafter  it was  overlooked  until  revived  by
Amar.
12
Amar's argument that article III requires the federal judiciary to
exercise judicial power in "all"  cases within the first three categories,
while permitting it to do so in any cases within the remaining  six, is
not exclusively textual.  His imaginative, multi-faceted, and forcefully
presented position draws on a rich variety of supporting arguments.
Amar's present article focuses on the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
responds in detail to a brief passage in Hart & Wechsler that raises the
following questions about his thesis:
If the distinction  between  the two  tiers  was  so significant,  why is
there so little evidence of explicit recognition of that distinction in
contemporary  commentary  or in the available  history of the  1789
Act?  Why did  that Act leave some significant gaps in federal court
jurisdiction, even in the 'mandatory'  categories? Why did the draft-
ers  of Article  III single out cases affecting  ambassadors,  etc.,  for
10  In relevant  part, article III  provides:
The judicial  Power shall extend to all  Cases,  in  Law and  Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which  shall be  made,  under  their  Authority;--to  all  Cases  affecting
Ambassadors,  other  public  Ministers  and  Consuls;-to  all  Cases  of
admiralty  and  maritime  Jurisdiction;-to  Controversies  to  which  the
United  States shall  be a Party;-to  Controversies  between  two or more
States;-between  a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens
of different  States;-between  Citizens  of the  same  State claiming  Lands
under the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States,  Citizens or Subjects.
U.S.  CONST.  art. III,  § 2.
11  14 U.S.  (1 Wheat.)  304 (1816).
12  In  1981,  Lawrence  Sager did  describe  Martin as stating  "that  Congress  is
required to vest all article III jurisdiction (or at least jurisdiction  over those cases that
are within the scope of article III by virtue of subject matter rather than the identity
of the parties)  in some  federal  court,"  but  did  not  develop  the  qualification.  See
Sager, supra note 3,  at 32  n.39; see also id. at 34  n.49.
Amar also  suggests  that  the  distinction  is  noted  in other  nineteenth  century
opinions.  For discussion of this point, see infra note 228.HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE III
mandatory  treatment  and  leave  Congress  an  option  in  cases  in
which the United States  was a  party?
1 3
I will take up Amar's response in Part II.  First, in Part I, I will
discuss  whether  the  Constitutional  Convention  and  ratification
debates  support  his  distinction  between  mandatory  and  non-
mandatory tiers in article III.  Part III offers some more general com-
ments about the significance of the historical record and the persua-
siveness  of his  approach.  Finally,  in Part  IV,  I  will  consider  the
question:  What  turns  on resolution  of the  debate  about  congres-
sional power  over federal court jurisdiction?
I.  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVENTION,  THE RATIFICATION  DEBATES,
AND  THE Two-TIER  THESIS
A.  The Textual Basis: Above All, of "All"
Amar's argument begins with the constitutional text.  One hesi-
tates  to add to  the ink  that has  been spilled  over  the meaning  of
"shall"  in article  III.14  The distinctive question  that Amar raises  is
13  HART  &  WECHSLER,  supra  note  2,  at  386-87  (footnotes  omitted).  The
casebook continues:
And what  are  the present-day  implications  of the  thesis  for  the  broad
scope of the Supreme  Court's discretion  to deny certiorari?  Or for the
authority of Congress to delegate certain matters  to the final decision of a
non-Article  III  federal tribunal?  Even  the most  ardent  advocates  of a
constitutional  right  to judicial  review have  not claimed  that any  matter
that can be considered a  "case"  within the scope of Article III is for that
reason  alone  beyond  the  authority  of  Congress  to  delegate  to  an
administrative agency for final decision.
Id. at 387  (footnote omitted).
14  Article III begins:  "Thejudicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress  may from time to
time ordain and establish"  U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I (emphasis added).  For the use of
the word "shall"  in article III,  § 2, see supra note  10.
Amar's view  that "shall"  is mandatory  is set forth  in Amar, Neo-Federalist View,
supra note  1, at  212,  215,  229-30,  239-40.  It seems  quite possible  that  "shall"  is
mandatory in a more limited sense:  if the judicial power is exercised by  the federal
government,  the  exercise  must  be  by  article  III  courts.  A  somewhat  different
approach  is  to read  the "shall  extend"  language as referring  only to matters  over
which the federal  courts have the capability  (rather than an obligation) to hear, and
"shall be vested in" as referring  to the courts  that may  (rather than must) exercise
that capability.
I have only one other observation to add.  It was left to the Committee of Detail
to prepare a draft fleshing out the Convention's decisions about the federal judiciary.
The proposal approved by the Convention began this way: "Resolved  That a national
Judiciary  be  established  to  consist  . . . ."  2  THE  RECORDS  OF THE  FEDERAL
CONVENTION  OF  1787, at 132  (M. Farrand ed. 1966)  [hereinafter REcoRDs]; see also I
id at 21-22, 230-31.  The familiar phrasing found in article  II-"Thejudicial  Power
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the relationship  between that verb and the selective use of "all"  in
article III's nine categories  of federal jurisdiction.
There  is  some  force  in  Martin  Redish's  objection  that  article
III's  language  is  hardly  the  obvious  way  to  express  an  intent  that
cases within Amar's first tier, but not those within the second, must
be heard by some article III court. 5  At the same time, far too many
constitutional  interpretations  could be  defeated  by  the  claim that,
with 20/20  hindsight,  the framers  could  have  expressed  their  sup-
port for a particular view more clearly.  Amar puts his textual argu-
ment in its best light by asking whether it can be a mere coincidence
that article III uses the word "all"  selectively not only when initially
listing  the nine heads  of jurisdiction, but also  when describing  the
Supreme Court's originaljurisdiction-where  "all"  modifies the sub-
ject-matter  component  (ambassadors) but  not the party-based  one
(state as a party). 6
of the  United  Sates,  shall  be vested  in  . . ."-appears  to have  originated  in  the
Wilson-Rutledge  draft in the  Committee of Detail,  see 2  RECORDS,  supra, at  172-73,
and that language  tracks the "shall  be vested language"  with which articles  I and II
each begins.  See, e.g.,  Martin v. Hunter's  Lessee,  14 U.S.  (1 Wheat.) 304, 329  (1816)
(noting this point).  It seems plausible  that the  language  was chosen  as much  for
symmetry  as to reflect a decision  (hardly clear from the Convention's proposal) that
some or all of the federal judicial power must be exercised by the federal judiciary.
The positions of the various  branches are not, to be sure, entirely symmetrical:
no  other branch  can  determine  whether  Congress  exercises  its  legislative  powers
under article I; to some extent, the :ame is true of executive powers under article II,
but  to  a  considerable  extent  the  scope  of executive  power  depends  upon  what
legislation has been enacted.  In theory, the judiciary could be situated like Congress
(i.e.,  having power  that no  other branch  can  regulate)  or like  the  executive  (i.e.,
having  some  powers  dependent  upon  congressional  legislation).  Indeed,  in  the
debate on the First Judiciary  Act, Representative Stone stated that just as the failure
to enact a tax does not divest Congress  of the legislative power, so the failure to give
the  federal  courts  jurisdiction  does  not  divest  them  of the judicial  power.  See  1
ANNALS  OF  CONG.  824  (J.  Gales ed.  1789)  (Note that there are  two  editions  of the
Annals of Congress and that this Article cites to a different edition than does Professor
Amar's article).  Of course, in that same debate, contrary views  were also expressed.
See infra notes  112-13  and accompanying  text.
15  See M.  REDISH,  FEDERAL  COURTS:  CASES,  COMMENTS  AND  QUESTIONS  185  (2d
ed. 1989).  During debate on The First Judiciary Act, Representative Stone stated:
It is not said in that instrument that you shall exercise  the judicial power
over all those cases, but that thejudicial power shall extend to those cases.
If it had been the idea of the Convention  that its judiciary should extend
so  as  positively  to  have  taken  in  all  these  cases,  they  would  so  have
declared it, and been explicit;  but they have given you a power to extend
your jurisdiction  to them, but have  not compelled  you to that extension.
ANNALS  OF CONG.,  supra note  14,  at 823.
16  See Amar, supra note 6, at 1524-25; see also Amar, OriginalJurisdiction,  supra note
1, at 480 (noting the same).  But see supra note 9 (questioning whether the jurisdiction
affecting ambassadors  is appropriately  categorized as based on subject matter).HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE  III
There  is,  however,  an  alternative  explanation  for  this  textual
variation.  Each  subject  matter  clause extends  to  "all  cases,"  while
each  of the  party-based  clauses  extends  to  "controversies.' 17  Willy
Fletcher recently  pointed  to considerable  evidence that in the early
years of the nation, Justices and commentators understood "cases"  to
encompass criminal and  civil proceedings,  while  "controversies" were
civil only.'"  And during the ratification era, at least one reference; in
the letters  of the  anti-federalist  "Agrippa,"  appears  to reflect  that
same  understanding. 9  Though  use  of the  word  "all"  to  modify
"cases"  would not  be  strictly  necessary  if the  distinction  between
cases and controversies were generally understood, it remains possi-
ble that "all"  was meant  to reinforce  the breadth of "cases"  rather
than to suggest that the subject matter clauses are mandatory.2°
17  See supra note  10.
18  See Fletcher, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment,  57  U. CHI. L.  REV.  131,  133
(1990).  Fletcher notes particularly  the explanation  of this distinction  found in St.
George  Tucker's  appendix  to  his  1803  American: edition  of  Blackstone.  See  1
BLACKSTONE'S  COMMENTARIES: WITH NoTEs  OF REFERENCE  TO THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS  OF  THE  FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  OF  THE
COMMONWEALTH  OF  VIRGINIA  420-21  (St. George  Tucker  ed.  1803);  see also  1 W.
CROSSKEY,  POLITICS  AND  THE  CONSTrruTION  614-15  (1953)  (stating,  without
supporting  citation, that  the framers  understood  "controversies"  as covering  only
civil actions); Casto, An Orthodox View of  the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional  Control Over
Federal  Jurisdiction, 89,  90  & n.4  (1990)  (noting that  some modem judges  have  set
forth  the same understanding, and  citing Aetna Life Ins.  Co. v. Haworth,  300 U.S.
227,  239 (1937)).
Story  himself may  have  agreed  with  this  interpretation.  His  Commentaries
expressly  state  that  the  federal  question  and  admiralty  jurisdictions  extend  to
criminal  cases,  see 3 J. STORY,  supra note  5,  § 1634,  at 502  & n.2  (citing Tucker's
explanation of the distinction); id. § 1667, at 534.  When Story then turns to the first
of the  "controversy"  jurisdictions  (United  States  as  a  party),  he  cites  at  length
Tucker's explanation of the distinction,  though without  clearly endorsing it.  See id.
§ 1668,  at 536 n.2.
19  Agrippa argued:
In article III, section 2,  it is declared, that 'the judicial power shall extend
to all cases  in law and  equity arising under this constitution,  the laws  of
the United States,  and treaties made or which shall be made under their
authority.'  Among  the  cases  arising  under  this  new  constitution  are
reckoned,  'all  [sic]  controversies  between  citizens  of different  states,'
which include all kinds  of civil  causes between those parties.
4 H.  STORING,  THE  COMPLETE  ANTI-FEDERALIST  96-97  (1981)  (reprinting Letter of
Agrippa to the Massachusetts  Convention  (Jan.  14,  1788)).
20  See 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note  18, at 614-615; cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419, 431 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (stating that "it was perhaps a proper
instance of caution in congress  to  guard against  the possibility"  that controversies
might be taken  to include  criminal cases  by including  the word "civil"  in the First
Judiciary Act).
In  an  earlier  article,  Amar  contended  that  the  suggested  distinction  is
undermined  by article III's  original jurisdiction  clause, in which  the  word "cases"
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The  First Judiciary  Act  is  consistent  with  this understanding.
The Act vests criminal jurisdiction  in  the lower federal courts in  fed-
eral question and admiralty cases.2 '  It  also vests original jurisdiction
in  the Supreme Court in  suits to which ambassadors and other diplo-
mats are parties, a grant that,, in marked contrast to the grant of orig-
inal jurisdiction  over state-as-party  cases,  is  not restricted  to  civil
suits. 2 2  By contrast, the Act appears to limit the party-based jurisdic-
tional grants to civil cases.
23
refers  to jurisdiction  where  a  state  is  a party  (previously  defined  in  article  III as
encompassing  only controversies)  as well as  the ambassador jurisdiction. See Amar,
Neo-Federalist  View,  supra note  1, at  244  n.128.  But it hardly  seems implausible that
article  III, having once  distinguished  cases  from  controversies,  would  in the  next
paragraph  use the single, broader  term as a catchall.
More  recently, Amar implicitly criticized  the suggested distinction by offering a
different explanation:  in a  "'case'.  ..  a judge's law-declaring role is paramount, and
[in] a 'controversy'...  a judge's ability as a dispute-resolver  is highlighted."  Amar,
Law  Story  (Book  Review),  102  HA.Rv.  L.  REV.  688,  717  (1989)  (quoting  Robert
Pushaw).  This  sounds  to  me like  an  infusion  of 20th  century  concepts  into  18th
century  language. But cf.  infra note 59  (perhaps committing the same sin).
21  See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.  20,  §§  9,  11,  1 Stat. 73,  76-79.
22  See id  § 13,  1 Stat. at  80-811.  Charles  Warren reports  that the only  federal
statute to provide for a criminal trial before  the Supreme Court involved  a criminal
prohibition  directed  at foreign consuls.  See Warren,  New Light on  the History of the
Federal  Judiciary Act of 1789,  37  HARv.  L.  REV.  49,  94  n.98  (1923).  It  is uncertain
whether  in fact the  federal  courts  would  have entertained  a  state  law prosecution
against an ambassador, given the strong tradition that one sovereign will not enforce
another's  penal  laws.  Compare The Antelope,  23  U.S.  (10  Wheat.)  66,  123  (1825)
(articulating that tradition)  with  28  U.S.C.  §§  1442-43  (1982)  (authorizing federal
court adjudication of state criminal prosecutions against federal  officials).
23  See Judiciary  Act  of  1789,  ch.  20,  §§  9,  11-13,  1  Stat.  73,  76-81;  see also
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co.,  127 'U.S.  265, 297-98  (1888)  (concluding that article
III's grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in suits by a state against a
citizen of another state does not extend to criminal matters).
Two  possible  objections  to  the  statement  in the  text should  be  noted.  First,
§ 12's  grant  of removal  jurisdiction  in  "any  action"  commenced  in  state  court
between citizens of the same state involving conflicting land grants was not expressly
limited  to  civil  cases.  In  theory,  -conflicting land  grants  could  arise  in  criminal
trespass actions under state law (or under the common law), and though § 12 plainly
did  not  contemplate  prosecution  by  the  United  States,  perhaps  it  could  have
encompassed  a  private  prosecution.  That possibility  seems  unlikely,  however,  for
§ 12 requires  that "the matter in dispute exceed[]  the aforesaid  sum or value of five
hundred dollars,"  and elsewhere in the Act, jurisdictional amount limits described by
that kind of language  apply only to  civil  actions.  See Judiciary Act  of 1789,  ch. 20,
§§  9,  11,  1 Stat. 73, 76-79.  By  contrast where the Act limits criminal jurisdiction  by
"amount  in  controversy,"  different  wording  is  used.  See id.  § 9,  1 Stat.  at  76-77
(giving the district courts criminal jurisdiction  "where no punishment other than...
a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars"  is to be inflicted).
Second,  § § 9 and  11  confer jurisdiction over all  crimes "cognizable  under the
authority  of the  United States."  Sections  9 and  11  could  be  viewed  as  extending
party-based jurisdiction  to criminal  cases  if, but  only if, (a)  the first  Congress,  in
drafting  those  provisions,  contemplated  the  institution  of common  law  criminalHISTORY AND  STRUCTURE  OF ARTICLE III
B.  The Significance of the Text
Even if one discounted this alternative explanation, the question
would  remain  whether  article  III's use  of "all"  strongly  supports
Amar's  distinction between  the two tiers.  Though Amar states that
the textual argument  alone  is not  "fully  satisfying" 24  and relies  on
other  arguments,  his  discussion  returns  repeatedly  to  this  "dra-
matic"  textual  variation.25  Do  the  records  of the  constitutional
period  support the weight  that he places on the word "all"?
1.  All  Quiet on the Two-Tier Front
At the Constitutional  Convention,  the plan that emerged from
the  deliberations  of  the  Committee  of the  Whole  stated  simply:
"Resolved,  that the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend
to cases  which  respect the collection  of national revenue:  impeach-
ments  of any  national  Officers:  and  questions  which  involve  the
national  peace  and  harmony." 26  To  that juncture,  there  is  no
recorded  suggestion of different  tiers within  the judicial power.
When  that  plan  came  before  the Convention  on July  18,  two
modifications were made.  First, the jurisdiction over impeachments
was stricken.27  Second,
[s]everal criticisms having been made on the definition; it was pro-
posed by Mr. [Madison]  so to alter as to read thus-'that the juris-
diction shall extend  to all cases  arising under the Natil.  laws:  And
to  such  other questions  as may  involve  the Natl.  peace  and  har-
mony.'  which was agreed  to nem.  con.
28
Amar views this second change as noteworthy because it "highlights
the  special  significance  .. .of federal  question jurisdiction"  and
"strongly  hints at a two-tier jurisdictional  scheme  ...  ."29  There is
no doubt that  the Convention delegates  stressed the importance of
federal  jurisdiction  repeatedly,  but  the  two-tier  structure  is  less
prosecutions by the United States, (b) those prosecutions otherwise involved no issue
(however  uncontroversial  or peripheral)  of federal  law,  see Osborn  v.  Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S.  (9 Wheat.)  738, 818-28 (1824),  and (c) Congress did not view
federal prosecutions for common law offenses  as arising under federal  law.
24  Amar, supra note 6, at  1566.
25  See id.; see also id. at 1501,  1507-08,  1524-25,  1543,  1547,  1558-59; Amar, Neo-
Federalist  View, supra note 1, at 240-42,  253,  254 n.160.
26  1  RECORDS,  supra note  14, at 231.
27  2 id. at 46.
28  Id.  (Madison's  notes);  see  also id.  at  132-33  (slightly  different  version  of
Madison's resolution).
29  Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note 1, at 243 n.127.
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apparent to me.  The difference in phrasing between  "all"  and "such
other questions" may signify not that the second set of cases should
be understood as less mandatory than the first, but only that the sec-
ond was  a catch-all  category,  necessarily  less well-defined  than the
"arising under" category.
Indeed, the hypothesis  that the Convention's  amendment  sug-
gests  that  federal  question  cases  were  to  be  mandatory,  while  all
other cases affecting peace and harmony were not, does not fit  well
with  contemporary  views  of admiralty  jurisdiction.  That  federal
courts should have  some form of admiralty jurisdiction, in order to
promote  national peace and harmony,  was among the least contro-
versial aspects of the debate over the national judiciary.30  Yet under
Amar's  reading  of the July  18  amendment,  admiralty  would  fall
within the non-mandatory  tier.  This prospect  creates further doubt
that that amendment  set forth a two-tier structure.
Article III's list of nine heads ofjurisdiction, and its selective use
of the word "all,"  derive from the draft prepared  by James Wilson
for the Committee of Detail.3"  There is no direct evidence that any
member  of the committee,  or  any  other  delegate,  understood  the
draft as creating mandatory  and non-mandatory tiers of federal judi-
cial power.  The short of the matter is  that Amar has not identified
so  See  THE FEDERALIST  No. 80, at  502  (A. Hamilton)  (Wright ed.  1961)  ("The
most bigoted  idolizers  of State  authority have not thus  far shown  a disposition  to
deny the national judiciary the  cognizance of maritime causes.");  infra note 87 and
accompanying  text.  In  the first Congress, anti-federalists  moved to strip  the lower
federal courts of all jurisdiction other than admiralty. See Warren, supra note 22, at 67-
68,  123.
The reasons  for the lack of controversy about admiralty jurisdiction are several.
First, before the Revolutionary War, maritime law had been administered  by British
vice-admiralty rather  than colonial courts.  "General  admiralty jurisdiction  was thus
not one  that state  courts  had  been  accustomed  to exercise;  and  state  legislatures
proved hesitant in conferring it upon them."  HART & WECHSLER, supra note 2,  at 14.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the first and last national court was established
to adjudicate  appeals from state courts in  piracy and capture cases.  See id. at 5  n.18.
During that period, the experience of "largely uncontrolled activity by a body of state
courts,  more  or  less  contemptuous  of national  reviewing  authority,  . . . led  the
national  leaders  to  agree  upon  the  necessity  for  federal  admiralty  courts."  D.
ROBERTSON,  ADMIRALTY  AND  FEDERALISM  103  (1970).
Though neither the Committee of the Whole's language  nor that of the July 18
amendment  specifically  referred  to  admiralty  jurisdiction,  some  version  of  that
jurisdiction  had  been  presented  to  and  discussed  in  the  Convention.  See,  e.g.,  1
RECORDS, supra note  14, at 21-22  (Randolph proposal); see also 2 id. at  136 (Pinckney
plan, which may not have been presented to the Convention proper).  See generally  D.
ROBERTSON,  supra, at 6-17.
31  See 2 RECORDS,  supra note  14,  at  186-87.  For discussion of Amar's argument
that an earlier draft, prepared by Edmund  Randolph for the Committee, supports his
argument, see infra note 35.HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE III
any speech at the Convention or ratification debates  that articulated
a distinction between mandatory and permissivejurisdictions 3 2  The
lack of articulation  at the Convention is  not so probative  given the
state of the surviving records and the shifting content of the judiciary
article.  More  telling  is  the  lack  of evidence  from  the  ratification
debates,  which  featured  quite  detailed  discussions  of the  finished
text of article III by many  participants,  including important figures
like Madison and Wilson.  Furthermore, though Amar relies heavily
on views expressed a quarter of a century later by Justice Story, it is
far from clear  that Story believed in Amar's  distinction.
3 3
32  See Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note  1, at 243 n.126.
33  Amar  sets  forth  the  relevant  passages  from  Story's  opinion  in  Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, some of which suggest that the entire judicial power is mandatory.  See
Amar, supra note 6,  at  1502 n.9.  A decision  in which  Story participated  two  years
later, while sitting as a circuit judge, adds to doubts that he read article III as having
two  tiers.  In  White v.  Fenner, 29  F. Cas.  1015  (O.C.R.I.  1818)  (No.  17,547)  (per
curiam),  the  court  dismissed,  as  outside  its  diversity jurisdiction,  a suit  in  which
neither party was  a citizen of the forum.  The opinion  stated, however, that
the constitution  declares  that it is mandatory  to the legislature,  that the
judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies  'between
citizens  of  different  states';  and  it  is  somewhat  singular,  that  the
jurisdiction actually conferred ...  should have stopped so far short of the
constitutional extent ....  But... [t]he language of the act is so clear, that
[  *  t]he suit must ...  be dismissed."
Id. at  1015-16.
But neither  Story's opinion in Martin nor his joining the decision in  White pro-
vides a good test of his adherence to the two-tier thesis.  Martin's discussion of Con-
gress's obligation  to vest federal question jurisdiction was pure dictum, as Congress
had done so.  In White, though statutory jurisdiction was  lacking, the case was within
Amar's  "non-mandatory"  tier.
Story did participate, however, in three decisions  squarely testing his allegiance
to the  two-tier thesis.  In each  case, the state court had  upheld a  claim  of federal
right;  the  losing  party sought  Supreme  Court review;  and  the  defendant  in error
argued that the Court had no statutory jurisdiction.  Were Story a true adherent of
the two-tier  thesis,  he would  have held unconstitutional  Congress's  failure to vest
federal  question jurisdiction over  these  cases  in  some federal  court.  Instead,  he
joined with the Court in simply dismissing for want of statutory jurisdiction.  See infra
note  74.
Herbert  Wechsler  has suggested,  further, that Story's  entire  dictum  in Martin
should  be read  in  light of his  "sustained  campaign  to  stimulate  the  Congress  to
enlarge  the jurisdiction of the lower courts and to expand the fragmentary corpus  of
the  national  statutory  law."  Wechsler,  The  Appellate Jurisdiction  of the  Supreme Court:
Reflections on  the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review,  34  WASH.  & LEE  L. REv.  1043,
1046 (1977); see also G. GuNTHER,  CONs-rrrONAL LAW 49-50 (11 th ed. 1985) (detail-
ing  Story's  lobbying  activities);  Gunther, supra note  2,  at  907  n.55  (stating  that
although  Story and John  Marshall  were  concerned  about  proposals  to repeal  the
Supreme  Court's jurisdiction to review state court decisions,  neither  they nor their
colleagues  suggested that such  a repeal would  be unconstitutional).
Amar contends that Story placed  more weight on the two-tier  thesis in his 1833
Commentaries than in Martin. See Amar, supra note 6, at  1502 n.9.  Perhaps that is so,
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Although  the distinction  may have been so self-evident  that no
one remarked  on  it,  there  are  reasons  to  doubt  that  explanation.
Some of the plans for the judiciary presented at the Convention also
included  the word "all"  in  describing certain jurisdictional  catego-
ries.  To be sure, these plans were not adopted; article III was.  But
examination of them leaves  two impressions:  that Amar's ranking of
the relative importance of the two tiers was not universally shared, 4
and that the word "all"  may have been used quite haphazardly rather
than to distinguish mandatory and permissive jurisdictions. 3 5
A venerable source, The Federalist  No. 80, casts further doubts on
but as Amar concedes, see  id.,  the Commentaries remain quite  equivocal on whether
all  of the federal judicial power, or only the first tier, is mandatory.  See 3 J. STORY,
supra note 5,  § 1696,  at 572-73  (Jurisdiction  is mandatory  "in  that class of cases,  at
least,  where it has  declared  that  it shall  extend  to 'all cases.' ");  id. § 1745,  at  618
(quoting the wavering language  from Martin itself).
34  For example, Randolph's  Virginia plan used "all"  in describing jurisdiction
over piracy  and felonies  on the high seas,  but not as to succeeding  clauses  (which
included "cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States ...  may be interested"
and "cases...  which respect...  questions which may involve the national peace and
harmony").  See  1 RECORDS,  supra note  14,  at  21-22.  Either  "all"  does  not  modify
federal  question  jurisdiction,  or  modifies  both  federal  question  and  diversity
jurisdiction.  Hamilton's plan (never presented  to the Convention,  but possibly the
basis for his speech ofJune  18,  1787) modified  every proposed head ofjurisdiction
with the word "all"--including  several party-based jurisdictions. See 3 id. at 626;  see
also infra note 36 and accompanying text.
35  For  example,  in  Paterson's  New Jersey  plan,  "all"  modified  piracy  and
capture  cases,  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  and  cases  in which  foreigners  may  be
interested,  but  not cases  involving  the  construction  of treaties,  despite  the  great
importance assigned to this last category in the Convention Debates.  See i RECORDS,
supra note  14, at  244.
The Randolph Draft for the Committee of Detail read as follows (the bracketed
material reflects modifications  in Rutledge's hand):
The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend
1.  to all cases,  arising under laws  passed by the general  [Legislature]
2.  to impeachments  of officers,  and
3.  to such other cases, as the national legislature may assign, as involving
the national peace and harmony,
in the collection of the revenue
in disputes between citizens of different states  [in disputes between a
State  & a Citizen or Citizens  of another State]
in disputes between  different  states; and
in  disputes,  in  which  subjects  or  citizens  of  other  countries  are
concerned
[& in Cases of Admiralty Jurisdn].
2 id. at  146-47  (footnote omitted).
Amar argues that the contrast between the first and third categories contains the
seeds of the two-tier approach. See Amar, Neo-Federalist  View, supra note 1, at 243.  It is
worth noting that "all"  modifies federal question but not admiralty jurisdiction, even
though the latter was perhaps the least controversial component of the federal judi-
cial power.  See supra note 30  and accompanying  text.  But because the  addition  ofHISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE  I15
Amar's  textual  argument.  There,  Hamilton  asserted  that  national
judicial power  should extend to cases  1) arising under federal  stat-
utes, 2) arising under the Constitution, 3)  in which the United States
is  a  party,  4)  involving  national  peace  (whether relating  to  inter-
course  with  foreign nations  or between  states),  5)  of admiralty  or
maritime jurisdiction,  and  6)  in  which  state  tribunals  would  lack
impartiality.  Hamilton used  the word  "all"  to describe  each of the
six  categories,  subject matter  and  party  based,  alike.a6  Moreover,
after discussing the first two categories, Hamilton said: "Still less need
be said in regard to the third point. Controversies between the nation
and  its members  or citizens,  can  only  be properly  referred  to  the
national tribunals."' 3'  Thus, for him, some party-based cases were at
least as important as federal question cases.  Finally, The Federalist  No.
80 does  not  group  the various jurisdictions  by  subject matter  and
party basis.  Rather, Hamilton's fourth category included the ambas-
sador jurisdiction and disputes  between states,  thus mixing Amar's
two tiers.
3 8
The Federalist  Papers were, of course, political debate, not consti-
admiralty  is in the hand ofJohn Rutledge, it is quite possible that Randolph's  omis-
sion and Rutledge's  failure to include the word "all"  were both oversights.
In addition, however, any federal court jurisdiction  to try impeachments  would
surely have been mandatory even though the word "all"  is missing from the second
head listed above. See Amar, Neo-Federalist  View, supra note  1, at 244 n.128 (conceding
the point, but discounting the significance  of the  omission).
36  See THE  FEDERALmST  No.  80, supra note  30,  at 499-500.  Hamilton was  not
alone among prominent federalists whose statements  in the ratification debates drew
no distinction between Amar's two-tiers.  See, e.g.,  2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 5, at
489-91  (remarks ofJames Wilson); 3  id at 532-33  (remarks ofJames Madison).
37  THE FEDERALIST  No. 80, supra note 30,  at 500  (emphasis added).
38  See id at 504.  Hamilton was by no means  the only convention delegate who
linked  the jurisdiction  over treaties,  foreign  diversity,  ambassadors,  and  interstate
disputes  as  necessary  to  promote  internal  and international  harmony.  See,  e.g.,  3
ELLIoT's  DEBATES,  supra note 5,  at  532-34  (remarks of James Madison  to Virginia
Ratifying  Convention);  id  at  570-71  (remarks  of Edmund  Randolph  to  Virginia
Ratifying Convention);  4 id. at 158-59  (remarks of William  Davie to North Carolina
Ratifying Convention); see also infra note 167.
Similarly, in the Pennsylvania  Ratifying Convention, James Wilson's  defense of
the "mandatory"  jurisdiction over cases  arising under  federal treaties sounds  very
much like his defense of the "permissive"jurisdiction  over controversies with foreign
citizens.  As to each, he argued that federal jurisdiction was needed to counteract the
risk  that states would  pass  laws  obstructing the payment  of debts to foreigners-a
prospect  that would impair  the United States'  relations with  foreign nations.  See 3
ELLoT's  DEBATES,  supra note  5, at 489-90, 492-93.
More  generally, Wilson discussed  all of the nine heads ofjurisdiction seriatim.
For each he quoted or paraphrased article III's language referring to "all cases" or to
"controversies."  He  did not,  however,  suggest  that  "all"  was  meant  to  separate
mandatory from permissive categories  ofjurisdiction.
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tutional  exegesis.  It is  possible  that  Hamilton  overlooked  the dis-
tinction  on which  Amar insists, or thought  it too  technical,  or  too
controversial,  to merit discussion.  Still,  The Federalist  No.  80 adds  to
my doubts about the force of Amar's  textual argument.
2.  Contemporary  Views  of the Relative  Significance
of the Two Tiers
A  different  argument  for  the  two-tier  thesis  would  emphasize
that the framers  considered the subject matter heads of  jurisdiction
more  important  than the party-based  heads.  I have  noted  already
the importance  generally  assigned to  the federal  maritime jurisdic-
tion.  But  it  is  far  from  clear  that  contemporaries  considered  the
other two subject matter heads to be more important than all of the
party-based  heads.
3 9
Some pertinent evidence is found in the various plans offered at
the  Convention.  They  do  not  square  with  Amar's  theory;  some
included  categories  from the non-mandatory  tier, or excluded cate-
gories  from the mandatory  tier, or both.40  Indeed, Professor Holt
has  recently  argued that a central  reason for creation  of a national
judiciary  was  to  establish  diversity  and  alienage  jurisdictions  to
39  But see Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note  1, at 243-45  & nn.127-30.
The ambassador jurisdiction  is  the only  one of the  three subject-matter  heads
that appears twice in article III--once in the initial listing of the heads ofjurisdiction,
and later in  the description of the original jurisdiction.  As Amar repeatedly  notes,
both times it is modified by the word "all."  See supra note  16 and accompanying text.
Yet it is striking how often Amar, in discussing the importance or mandatory nature
of the first-tier, refers  only  to federal question and  admiralty  cases.  See, e.g.,  Amar,
supra note  6, at 1508,  1512-13,  1527 n.85,  1529-30,  1544-45,  1556-57,  1558-59.
Amar argues that if cases affecting ambassadors  seem less important to national
interests than cases  to which the United States is a party or controversies involving a
state,  the reason is that  the latter categories  are likely to involve federal  questions.
For critical  discussion of this point,  see infra notes  49,  134 and accompanying  text.
40  Randolph's  Virginia  Plan,  for  example,  included  party-based  jurisdiction
where citizens of other states or foreign countries might be interested.  It set forth no
separate  jurisdiction  over  cases  involving  ambassadors  and  no  general  federal
question jurisdiction  (though it  proposed jurisdiction  over  "questions  which  may
involve  the national peace and harmony").  See  1 RECORDS,  supra note  14,  at  21-22.
Patterson's NewJersey  Plan listed cases in which foreigners may be interested before
listing its limited jurisdiction relating to the construction of federal treaties and some
federal statutes,  and did not provide for a general  federal question jurisdiction.  See
id. at 244.  Pinckney's  plan gave  the Supreme Court jurisdiction  where the United
States was a party but not in cases involving ambassadors.  See 2 id. at  136. Hamilton's
plan gave  the Supreme  Court  original jurisdiction over  cases involving  the  United
States,  or  two  or  more  states,  but  only  appellate  jurisdiction  of cases  in  which
constitutional  rights  were  at  issue,  and  (perhaps  through  an  oversight)  did  not
include admiralty jurisdiction. See 3  id. at 626.HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE 1I1
respond to problems of localism apparent in debtor-creditor difficul-
ties after the Revolution.4  Noting the severity of those difficulties
and the special problems experienced by British creditors and Loyal-
ist property owners, he goes  so far as  to assert that "alienage juris-
diction was the most important head of  jurisdiction in article III."42
One  need not share that conclusion  to appreciate  how  much more
importance  the party-based jurisdictions  assumed in  1787 than they
do today.
As for the ratification  debates,  though I  have  only dipped into
the records,  I  have found  a number of fragments  that are hard to
square  with  the two-tier thesis.  On  the federalist  side, I  return to
Hamilton's  The  Federalist  No. 80 and to discussions by such figures as
James  Madison  and James  Wilson.43  More  generally, one jurisdic-
tion that was particularly free from controversy was that in disputes
between  two  states.44  Its  necessity  is  apparent:  on  the  one hand,
each state might lack power to subject the other (absent its consent)
to suit;45  on the other, the exercise  of  jurisdiction raises an obvious
problem,  in Amar's  words,  of "home  field  advantage.",46  It  is  no
doubt because neither  of these  alternatives  is  tolerable  that Justice
Story called federal jurisdiction  over such disputes  "essential  to the
preservation  of the peace  of the nation. '' 47  Amar's  argument  that
some categories of the federal judicial power are mandatory, but not
this  one, strikes me as implausible.
On the anti-federalist side, there is little doubt that the diversity
jurisdiction  drew  the  strongest attacks.48  But  some anti-federalist
writers  viewed  other  party-based  heads  (those  between  states,
between  co-citizens  claiming  under different  states'  land grants,  in
which  the United  States  was a party,49  or in which  foreigners  were
41  See Holt, "To Establish  Justice": Politics, the  Judiciary  Act of 1789, and the Invention
of the Federal  Courts, 1989 DurE LJ. 1421,  1473.
42  Id at 1466  n.170.
43  See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying  text.
44  See,  e.g.,  3  ExxoT's  DEBATES,  supra note  5,  at  532-33  (remarks  of James
Madison).
45 But  see  Nevada  v.  Hall,  440  U.S.  410,  414-27  (1979)  (holding  that  the
Constitution does not preclude  a state from subjecting an unconsenting  sister state
to suit).
46  Amar, Original  Jurisdiction,  supra note 1, at 477.
47  3J. STORY, supra note 5,  § 1673, at 543; see also infra text accompanying  notes
96-101.
48  See  Clinton,  A  Guided Quest, supra note  4,  at  801  (citing sources  for  this
proposition).
49 On the three heads just mentioned,  see 4 H. STORING, supra note  19, at 131-
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parties50 )  as  appropriate,  while  doubting  the  appropriateness  of
"arising  under"  jurisdiction.  Another,  the  writer  Brutus,  treated
maritime  cases  together  with  controversies  to  which  the  United
States is a party and those between states as appropriate for national
courts, as  "none but the general government,  can, or ought to pass
laws on their subjects."5 1  In a similar vein, the Virginia Convention
proposed  an  amendment  that  would have limited  federal  question
jurisdiction to  cases  arising  under treaties, but also included  party-
based jurisdiction  where  the  United  States  was  a  party,  in  suits
between states, and in disputes involving land grants from different
states.
52
None of this evidence  "proves"  that Amar's  thesis is mistaken,
and Amar is surely right to  caution against requiring discovery of a
"smoking  gun." 53  For him, the use of the word "all"  carries impor-
tant meaning, and places the burden of proof on. those who dispute
its significance.  Indeed, he taxes me for not having identified eight-
eenth century figures who denied its significance.54  But I am not sur-
32 (reprinting Essay by Candidus (Dec. 20, 1987) (attributed to Samuel Adams or his
follower Benjamin  Austin, Jr.)).
Amar suggests  that  insofar  as  suits  brought  by  the  United  States  are  today
viewed as especially important, it is because federal law is likely to govern.  See Amar,
supra note  6,  at  1508.  The point  seems  dubious  to me.  Though formally  federal
common  law governs  the proprietary relationships  of the United  States, in practice
the law applied is presumptively  state law.  See, e.g.,  United States v.  Kimbell  Foods,
440 U.S.  715, 739-40  (1979).
Moreover,  there is little reason  to think that the framers viewed such actions as
important because federal  law would govern.  "The extent to which state or federal
law  governed  in  such  suits  was  not  subjected  to  precise  analysis;  it was  simply
assumed  or asserted  that the case  was  to be brought under 'local  law.'  "  HART  &
WECHSLER, supra note 2,  at 863; see also Cotton v.  United States,  52 U.S.  (11  How.)
228  (1850);  cf  4  THE  FOUNDERS'  CONsTrrlroN  357  (P. Kurland & R.  Lerner  eds.
1987)  (reprinting W.  RAwLE,  A VrEw  OF THE CoNsTrrrioN  OF THE  UNITED  STATES
(2d ed.  1829)).  The framers'  reason for creating  this jurisdiction  was  not the one
Amar posits.  See,  e.g.,  2  ELLIOT'S  DEBATES,  supra note 5,  at 490 (remarks  of James
Wilson)  ("[T]he  universal  practice  of all  nations  has, and  unavoidably  must have,
admitted of this power"  to decide cases in which  the nation  is a party.);  see also 3 J.
STORY,  supra note 5,  § 1668, at 537  ("It would be a perfect novelty in the history of
national jurisprudence, as well as of public law, that a sovereign has no authority to
sue in his own courts."); id.  § 1744,  at 617  (explaining article  III's failure to use the
word  "all"  in  describing  this  jurisdiction  as  designed  to  avoid  subjecting  the
sovereign  to suit).
50  See 4 H. STORING, supra note  19, at  112 (reprinting Letter from Agrippa to the
Massachusetts  Convention  (Feb.  5,  1788) (attributed to James Winthrop)).
51  2 H.  STORING, supra note  19,  at 428-29  (reprinting Essay of Brutus  (Feb. 21,
1788)).
52  See 3  ELLIOT'S DEBATES,  supa note 5,  at 660-61.
53  See Ainar, supra note 6, at  1566; see also infra text accompanying  notes  139-63.
54  Amar, supra note 6, at  1543 n. 159.HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE 111
prised  that  these  statesmen  did not devote  their time to denying a
proposition that no one seemed to be affirming.  For me, Amar's the-
sis  is  unconvincing in light of the striking absence of even  a single
contemporary  source setting forth the two-tier thesis, the plausibility
of the explanation  that "all"  was meant to reinforce  the breadth of
cases  (as  distinguished  from  controversies),  and  the  evidence  that
"all"  was often used by the important figures  at the Convention and
in the ratification debates  to mean something other than what Amar
suggests.
II.  THE FIRST JUDICIARY ACT  AND  THE Two-TIER  THESIS
In  discussing  the  meaning  of article  III,  many  have  assigned
great weight to the views of members of the first Congress, a number
of whom were delegates  to the Constitutional  Convention or partici-
pants  in  the  ratification  debates.55  Amar's  argument  is  to  some
extent in that tradition.  He asserts that the First Judiciary Act lends
support to his  thesis, while some of his critics  suggest the opposite
view.  Who has  the better of the argument?
A.  The First  Judiciary  Act:  "Gaps" in the  "Mandatory" Tier
The  starting  point  for  resolving  this  question  must  be  to
examine  whether  the  Act  fully  vested jurisdiction  in  all  three  of
Amar's "mandatory  tier"  categories.
1.  The "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and Supreme Court Review
of State Court Judgments
Since the FirstJudiciary Act did not give the lower federal courts
general  "arising under" jurisdiction,  that  "mandatory"  jurisdiction
could  be  fully vested  in  the federal judiciary  only  if the  Supreme
Court had plenary appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.
But the pertinent provision,  section 25  of the First Judiciary Act,56
falls short.  Each of its three clauses appears to restrict review to state
court decisions denying claims of federal right or immunity.57  It was
55  See,  e.g.,  Wisconsin v.  Pelican Ins.  Co.,  127  U.S. 265,  297 (1888);  Casto,  The
First Congress's Understanding  of  Its Authority Over the Federal  Courts'Jurisdiction,  26 B.C.L.
REv.  1101,  1103,  1125-26  (1985);  Gunther, supra note 2,  at 906.  For discussion  of
whether  those  views  should have  great weight,  see infra text accompanying  notes
139-63.
56 Judiciary  Act of 1789,  ch. 20,  § 25,  1 Stat. 73,  85.
57  Section  25 permitted  review of
a final judgment or decree...  where is drawn in question the validity of a
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not until 1914 that Congress granted the Court jurisdiction without
regard to whether the state court had decided  the federal  issue.
58
On first blush,  then,  it appears  that at least until  1914,  article
III's "arising  under" jurisdiction was  not fully vested  in the federal
courts.5 9  From  the start, Amar has  recognized  the difficulty  posed
treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and
the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity
of [state  action as]  repugnant  to the constitution,  treaties  or laws of the
United  States, and the decision is in favour of such  their validity, or where is
drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of
a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the
decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by
either party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission
Id. at 85-86 (footnote omitted  and emphasis added).
58  Act of December 23,  1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.  See generally F. FRANKFURTER &
J. LANDIS,  THE  BUSINESS  OF THE  SUPREME  COURT  188-98  (1928).
59  There  is  one other  respect  in  which  § 25  did  not  fully  vest  the  federal
question jurisdiction.  That section permitted review of state court decisions  via writ
of error,  which  remained  the  exclusive  basis  for review  until  1914  and  was  not
entirely displaced  until  1928.  See  HART & WECHSLER,  supra note 2,  at  502-03.  The
technical nature of the writ of error was generally understood as precluding review of
state court findings of fact, in non-jury as  well as jury cases.  See,  e.g.,  Egan v.  Hart,
165 U.S.  188,  189 (1897);  Note, Supreme Court Review of State Court Findings of Fact, 55
HARV.  L. REV. 644, 645-46  (1942).  Thus, article III's "arising under" jurisdiction-
which  even  on  appeal  extends  to  questions  of fact  as  well  as law-was  not  fully
vested.
For some, the independent ard adequate state ground doctrine would constitute
an additional gap in the federal  question jurisdiction, one continuing to this day.  At
least since  the decision  in Eustis  v. Bolles,  150  U.S.  361,  370  (1893),  the Supreme
Court has refused to decide federal  questions where the state court judgment rests
on an adequate and independent state ground.  Many commentators  argue that there
is  no  constitutional barrier  to the Supreme  Court's  exercising jurisdiction  in such
cases.  See,  e.g.,  Matasar & Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal  Jurisdictional  Policy,
andAbandonment of  the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM.  L. REV.
1291,  1294-1315  (1986); Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground:
Proposals  for a Revised Doctrine, 1965  SuP. CT.  REV.  187,  201-03;  Note,  The  Untenable
Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HARv.  L. REV.  1375,  1379  (1961)  (arguing
that  the  constitutional  basis  of the  doctrine  is  questionable);  Note,  Supreme Court
Disposition of State Decisions Involving Non-Federal  Questions, 49 YALE  LJ. 1463 (1940).  I
confess to finding these arguments highly problematic,  and Amar may well share my
doubts.  But if the argument were accepted, then another gap exists, at least insofar
as  the  adequate  state  ground  doctrine  is  viewed  as  an  interpretation  of  the
jurisdictional statute rather than a self-imposed (and judicially reversible) doctrine of
self-restraint.
There is one last possible "gap"  in that jurisdiction, though I admit that raising
it requires  looking at  Amar's  theory  through  a  20th  century  lens.  I suspect  that
Amar, with  his  strong nationalist  inclination,  might  well  view  article III's  "arising
under"  clause  as  permitting  Congress  to  confer  protective jurisdiction-that  is,
jurisdiction to hear cases falling within a subject matter that Congress has regulated,
or constitutionally  could regulate, even if the  case involves  no issue of federal law.HISTORY AND  STR UCTURE OF ARTICLE  I15
for  his  thesis."  In  1985,  he  responded  by  analogizing  Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction under article III to district court "arising
under"  jurisdiction  under  28  U.S.C.  § 1331,  and  suggested  that
review  of a state  court  decision might be viewed  as  arising under
federal  law  (for purposes  of article III) only if the appellant claims  a
federal  right.6'  Beyond  difficulties  with  the analogy,62  there  lies a
simple problem:  an appeal from a state court's decision upholding a
federal right either does or does not fall within article III's  "arising
under" jurisdiction.  If it does not, then in  1914, Congress unconsti-
tutionally  extended  the  Supreme  Court's jurisdiction  beyond  the
bounds of article  III. If (as  I  think) it does,  then there  was  a very
large "gap"  prior to  1914.63
See Amar,  Neo-Federalist View,  supra note  1,  at  266  n.199  (offering  an analogy  to
protective jurisdiction).  See generally  HART  &  WECHSLER,  supra  note  2,  at  975-89
(discussing the meaning and validity of protective jurisdiction).  If so, then unless the
"mandatory"  "arising under" jurisdiction in fact has mandatory and non-mandatory
components, see infra note 63, under his theory the judicial power must extend to all
cases  in which  Congress  could  constitutionally  confer  protective jurisdiction.  It  is
difficult  to  imagine  how  Congress  could  draft  legislation  complying  with  that
requirement.
60  See Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note  1, at 262-65.
61  See id.
62  Not  only  do  the  meanings  of the  statutory  and  constitutional  provisions
differ, see,  e.g.,  Franchise  Tax  Bd. of Cal. v.  Construction  Laborers Vacation Trust,
463 U.S.  1, 8-9 n.8 (1983);  Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
494-95  (1983),  but so do  the nature  of original  district court and  Supreme  Court
appellate jurisdiction.  See  HART  & WECHSLER,  supra  note  2,  at  530-31,  983.  In the
Supreme  Court context,  there  is  a state  court  decision  that  has  resolved  various
issues; one  can  determine  if the  decision  rested on federal  law, and if so, how  the
issue  was resolved.  By  contrast,  when  a  case  is  filed  in  a district court  under  28
U.S.C.  § 1331,  not  only  is  it impossible  to be certain  what  issues  will  arise  or be
determinative,  but  it is,  obviously,  impossible  to ask  whether a prior adjudication
upheld or denied  the federal right.
Until amended in 1867, § 25 conferred jurisdiction only if the reviewable federal
issue was apparent from the face of the record.  CompareJudiciary  Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§ 25,  1 Stat. 73, 85 with Act of February 5,  1867, ch. 28,  14 Stat. 385, 386 (repealing
that limitation).  The "record" did not include the state court's opinion.  See Williams
v.  Norris,  25  U.S.  (12  Wheat.)  117,  118-19  (1827).  Prior  to  1867,  however,  the
Supreme Court seems to have been able to determine (whether from the record or
from counsel's arguments) what the state court had in fact decided.  See, e.g.,  Ryan v.
Thomas,  71  U.S.  (4 Wall.) 603, 604  (1866);  Commonwealth  Bank of Ky.  v. Griffith,
39 U.S.  (14  Pet.) 56, 57  (1840).
63  One might try to read the "arising under"jurisdiction  as having a mandatory
component  (review  of  claims  of  denial  of federal  rights)  and  a  non-mandatory
component (review of other claims).  See Amar, Neo-Federalist  View, supra note 1, at 266
n.199;  cf  Sager,  supra note  3,  at  52-57  (reading  article  III  as  requiring  federal
oversight  of the  states'  compliance  with  the  federal  Constitution,  and  § 25  as
consistent  with  that  understanding).  On  that  reading,  though,  Amar's  textual
emphasis  on  "shall"  and  "all,"  and  many  of his  structural  arguments  about  the
importance of article III adjudication  of all federal question cases,  miss the mark.
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Though not jettisoning his argument  that article III's appellate
jurisdiction is narrow,  64 Amar now stresses the quite different  expla-
nation that section 25 was really quite broad:  "In  virtually every case in
which one party argues for a federal 'right,'  the other side can argue
that it  has a federal  'immurity'-which  is  simply another way of say-
ing that one's opponent has no federal right."6 5  He says, for exam-
ple,  that  if  a  state  court  upholds  a  criminal  defendant's  bill  of
attainder  claim,  the  state  may  seek  review  under  the  tenth
amendment.
6 6
Beyond  the tension  (if  not  outright  conflict) between  the two
arguments, I find this second argument no more convincing.  Immu-
nity  usually means  something  different  from  a  plaintiff's  lack of a
claim.  Suppose, for example, that in  a libel action against a newspa-
per, a state court found the plaintiff to be a public figure.  Ordinarily,
we would say that, absent proof of actual malice, the defendant news-
paper has an immunity or privilege.  We do not mean that the news-
paper did  not defame  the plaintiff and cause  him injury, but rather
that even assuming it  did, supervening federal law affords a defense.
Nor do  I think we would  say that the plaintiff, if he sought Supreme
Court review of the state court's decision that he was a  public figure,
64  See Amar, supra note  6, at  1529.
65  Id. at  1530.  His initial article mentioned this second argument,  though in a
far briefer and more tentative way.  See Amar, Neo-Federalist  View, supra note  1, at 264.
The argument  was  previously  made  in Ratner,  Congressional Power over the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109  U.  PA.  L.  REv.  157,  185-87  (1960)  [hereinafter
Ratner, Congressional Power].
66  See  Amar, supra note  6, at  1530-31.  Amar raises  an  important  point about
Supreme Court review, quite properly taking issue with the view that so long as state
courts  uphold federal rights, Supreme  Court review is  unnecessary or unimportant.
See id  at  1532-33  & n.1 1l (citing Bator,  The  State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM.  &  MARY  L. REv.  605,  631-35  (1981));  see also HART  & WECHSLER,
supra note 2,  at 554-57.  For a recent expression of the view that Amai" criticizes,  see
Michigan  v. Long, 463 U.S.  1032,  1067-71  (1983)  (Stevens, J., dissenting).
That point, however, does not solve  the problem  under  § 25.  Suppose  a state
court upholds  a  claim  that the defendant,  a European  bank  with American  offices,
violated the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA),  15 U.S.C.  §§  1607,  1635 (1988).  It
is one thing  to argue that there may be federal  interests  (promotion of uniformity,
correcting  an  erroneous  understanding  of  the  TILA)  in  reviewing  possible
"overprotection"  of federal rights.  It is another to suggest that in seeking review, the
bank possesses  a justiciable  "right"  or "immunity"  or  "exemption"  under federal
law.  See Sager, supra note 3, at 53 n.104  (distinguishing, in this context, federal rights
from federal  interests). Indeed, what provision of federal law would be the source of
the  bank's  right  or immunity?  The  TILA  gives  rights  to  borrowers  and  against
lenders,  not vice versa. The tenth amendment is in my view most plausibly read as a
truism, see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.  100,  124 (1941),  but it is doubtful  in any
event that it confers  rights on foreign  citizens.HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE III
would be asserting a federal right or immunity (a right not to be a
public figure?).  Amar's usage seems more than a bit unconventional.
In  a  1908  decision,  however,  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  its
jurisdiction using reasoning somewhat like Amar's,67 and three cases
thereafter  followed  suit.68   Amar  thus  argues  that  "blame  for
whatever  'gaps'  emerged under section 25 should be laid at the feet
not of the first Congress, but of subsequent Supreme Courts and the
lawyers  who brought cases  to them ....
This conclusion  seems a bit cavalier.  In its first encounter with
the restrictive  language  of section 25,  the  Court (per Chief Justice
Marshall) dismissed the appeal in a one-page opinion, which read the
statute as dearly precluding review where the state court upheld fed-
eral rights.7 °  Given his emphasis on textual argument, Amar should
be receptive  to  the question why each of section 25's  three clauses
includes  what  appears  to  be  a  limitation  of jurisdiction  to  cases
where the state court refuses  to recognize  a  federal  right, if (as he
argues)  inclusion of that limitation makes no difference.
67  See St. Louis,  Iron Mtn.  & S.  Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S.  281,  292-93 (1908).
68  See Southern Ry. v. Crockett,  234 U.S.  725,  730  (1914)  (implicitly accepting
the argument); St. Louis, Iron Mtn.  & S. Ry. v. McWhirter,  229 U.S.  265, 275 (1913);
Seaboard Air Line Ry.  v. Duvall,  225 U.S.  477, 485-86  (1912).
Ratner  cites these cases  and offers  an argument similar to Amar's.  See Ratner,
Congressional  Power, supra note 65,  at 185 & nn. 135-37.  Ratner also points to Palmer
v.  Hussey,  119  U.S.  96  (1886),  but  it provides weaker  support for  the argument.
There, the state court ruled that a debtor had a valid federal discharge in bankruptcy.
The  creditor's  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  was  based  on  a  federal  statutory
provision that "no debt created by the fraud...  of the bankrupt, or...  while acting
in any fiduciary  character, shall be discharged ....  ."  Id. at 98.  That provision could
be viewed as giving the creditor a specific federal right that counteracted or trumped
the  general federal rights of debtors  upon discharge.  The Supreme Court did  not
specifically reach this question as the parties' pleadings  did not establish either fraud
or fiduciary  duty.
The other  three cases  Ratner  cites do  not support  his view.  All  involve  state
court denials of defenses, under federal law, to potential liabilities; the appellant was
thus asserting that the state court gave inadequate scope to a federal immunity from
liability.  See  Straus & Straus v. American  Publishers'  Ass'n,  231  U.S.  222,  233-34
(1913)  (In an antitrust  action,  state courts  found resale  price maintenance  to be a
violation as to uncopyrighted books but not as to copyrighted books; plaintiff sought
review of denial of relief under Sherman Act as to the latter.); Illinois Central R.R. v.
McKendree, 203 U.S.  514, 525 (1906) (State court decision rejected appellant's  claim
that regulation under which  it was held liable was unconstitutional.);  Nutt v. Knut,
200 U.S.  12,  18-19  (1906)  (State court decision  rejected appellant's claim of federal
immunity from common law  liability.).
69  Amar, supra note 6, at  1532.
70  Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 7 U.S.  (3 Cranch) 268 (1806).  For the text of § 25, see
supra note 57.
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Though we know very little about section 25's drafting,7 1 there
is an obvious explanation  for the limitation.  As ChiefJustice Taney
noted  in a subsequent discussion, Congress  might  have feared  that
state  courts  would  underprotect  rather  than  overprotect  federal
rights.
72
In  sixteen  decisions  stretching from  1806  to  1902,  the  Court
invariably adhered to Marshall's understanding of section 25.
73 Jus-
tice  Story joined  the  three  relevant  decisions  rendered  during  his
tenure,74  and throughout this period not a single Justice appears  to
have differed on this point.75  In 1914, Congress believed there was a
71  Amar notes that in the first Congress, Rep. Jackson of Georgia, referring to
§ 25, said: "Sir, in my opinion, and I am convinced experience will prove it, there will
not, neither  can there be any  suit or action brought in any  of the State courts,  but
may,  under  this  clause,  be  reversed  or  affirmed  by  being  brought  within  the
cognizance  of the  Supreme Court."  See  ANNALS  OF  CONG.,  supra note  14,  at  815,
quoted in Amar, supra note 6, at  1558. Jackson's statement was  offered in support of a
proposal  to restrict the lower federal  courts' jurisdiction  to admiralty  cases,  leaving
federal question  cases to be litigated in the first instance in state courts.  The debate
focused on whether state courts would vigorously and impartially enforce federal law,
or whether instead broader jurisdiction  was needed  in the lower federal  courts.  See
ANNALS  OF CONG., supra note  14, at 779  (remarks of Rep. Smith); id. at 804 (remarks
of Rep.Jackson) (state courtjudges take an oath to uphold supremacy of  federal law).
In  that  context, Jackson  may  have  been  concerned  primarily  with  the  review  of
decisions  failing to uphold  claims of federal right.  And  though Jackson's statement
quotes  § 25 in its entirety, he does not focus on the restrictive  language in its three
clauses or indicate how he would square the language quoted above with § 25's text.
In the  end,  it is  hard  to  make  very  much  of this snippet-particularly  in view  of
Amar's  proper  insistence  that  an  enactment's  language  is  the  best  evidence  of
legislative intent.  See Amar, supra note 6, at  1547 & n.171.
Though  the  legislative  history  of  § 25  is  sparse,  a  letter  written  by
Representative Smith of South Carolina on August 9, 1789 reflects his awareness that
appeals under § 25 were not "reciprocal."  See  The Letters of William L. Smith, 69 S.C.
HIST. MAGAZINE  13,  22 (Rogers ed. 1968).  I thank Akhil Amar for pointing me to this
letter.
72  See Commonwealth  Bank  of Ky.  v.  Griffith,  39 U.S.  (14  Pet.) 56, 58  (1840).
73  The cases are cited in F. FRANKFURTER  &J. LANDIS,  supra note 58, at 190 n.20.
74  See Fulton v. McAffee, 41  U.S. (16  Pet.)  149  (1842);  Commonwealth  Bank of
Ky.  v.  Griffith, 39 U.S.  (14  Pet.)  56  (1840);  Montgomery  v.  Hernandez,  25 U.S. (12
Wheat.)  129  (1827).
75  In  two of these cases,  a single Justice entered a  dissent, without opinion,  to
the Court's  dismissal of an  appeal for want of jurisdiction. See De Lamar's  Nevada
Gold  Mining  Co.  v.  Nesbitt,  177  U.S.  523,  529  (1900)  (McKenna, J.,  dissenting);
Roosevelt v. Meyer, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 512,  517 (1863)  (Nelson, J., dissenting).  But in
each  case  both parties  claimed  rights  under  federal  law,  and  in  each  the  dissent
appears  to have been directed not at the Court's general understanding  of § 25,  but
rather at the application of that understanding where multiple claims of federal right
collide.
In Roosevelt,  the state court upheld  the validity of the congressional  legislation
making  paper  notes  legal  tender.  When  the  creditor  sought  review,  the  Supreme
Court ruled that it had no jurisdiction  because the state court had upheld the federalHISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE 1I1
gap that needed filling.  Finally, even if the "correct"  interpretation
of section  25  eluded  the bench  and  bar  for  a  century,  the  point
remains  that no Justice even  hinted that the prevailing view raised
any constitutional difficulty.76  For all of these reasons, Amar fails to
statute. See Roosevelt, 68 U.S.  (1 Wall.) at 517.  Justice Nelson's dissenting vote thus
appears  to have taken the quite reasonable position (urged by the creditor's counsel,
see id. at 515-16) that § 25 permitted review of a state court's denial of the creditor's
constitutional  challenge to the validity of the legal  tender act.  That Nelson agreed
with the Court's general approach to § 25 is evidenced by his having joined the other
cases  decided while he was on the  Court that found no jurisdiction to review state
court decisions upholding federal rights. See Ryan  v. Thomas, 71  U.S. (4 Wall.)  603
(1866);  Reddall v. Bryan, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 420 (1860);  Burke v. Gaines, 60 U.S. (19
How.)  388  (1856);  Linton  v.  Stanton,  53  U.S.  (12  How.)  423  (1851);  Strader  v.
Baldwin, 50  U.S. (9  How.) 261  (1850).
In De Lamar's, an action to quiet title to a mine, both parties'  claims arose under
federal  mining  laws.  The  dispute  revolved  around  the  effect  of certain  federal
statutes on the validity of plaintiff's claim; if valid, his claim would prevail; if not valid,
then defendant would  have title.  The state court ruled for plaintiff.  The Supreme
Court dismissed,  finding  that  the real  dispute  was about  plaintiff's  claim,  and  the
mere fact  that the defendant  claimed  under federal  law  was  insufficient  to confer
jurisdiction  under  § 25.  See  De Lamar's,  177  U.S.  at  526-27.  Justice  McKenna's
dissenting vote can thus be understood as accepting the argument that the state court
denied defendant's  claim of title under federal  law, and hence under § 25 he could
seek  review.  Like  Nelson,  McKenna joined  other  decisions  refusing jurisdiction
because the state court had upheld the claim  of federal right, see Baker v. Baldwin,
187 U.S. 61  (1902);  Kizer v. Texarkana & Ft. Smith Ry.,  179 U.S. 199  (1900), though
he later joined the line of decisions, discussed in the text, that looked the other way,
see supra notes  67-68 and accompanying  text.
76  Hart & Wechsler cites Commonwealth  Bank of Ky v. Griffith, 39 U.S.  (14  Pet.)
56  (1840),  for  the  proposition  that  the  Supreme  Court  viewed  its  appellate
jurisdiction as within the scope of  congressional prerogative.  Amar's rejoinder is that
Taney's opinion in Gffith is "egregious"  and "sloppy"  and deserves less weight than
Story's  opinion  in Martin  v.  Hunter's Lessee,  14  U.S.  (I  Wheat.)  304  (1816).  See
Amar, supra note 6,  at  1531-32.  In response, I would  note these points:
1.  Story's opinion wavers considerably.  At times it suggests the two-tier distinction,
but at other times it suggests that the entire judicial power must be vested. See Amar,
supra note 6, at  1502 n.9; see also supra note 33 (noting doubts that Story adhered to a
mandatory view of any sort).
2.  In discussing the existence of jurisdiction under § 25 in Martin, Story italicized
the words  "the  decision is against  the title, right, privilege, or exemption, specially
set up or claimed by either party under such clause," and proceeded to observe that
the Virginia court had "denied the validity of a statute of the United States."  Martin,
14  U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 353.
3.  In Martin, because  statutory jurisdiction  under  § 25 was  clear, any  implication
about the scope of § 25  in other cases,  or about the constitutionality of a less  than
plenary interpretation of § 25,  was dictum.
4.  When  the  issue  was  squarely  presented  to  the  Court  in  Grzffith,  Story joined
Taney's  "sloppy"  opinion.
As  for  the  particular  application  of § 25  in  Griffith,  Amar  suggests  that  the
plaintiff in error might have claimed  a denial of rights under the full faith and credit
clause, for a Missouri court had refused to apply a Kentucky law, finding it invalid under
the federal Constitution. See Amar, supra note 6, at 1532.  I am no expert on full faith
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convince me that section 25 did not leave a very large gap in federal
court "arising under" jurisdiction.
I might add a related point in view of Amar's reply to this Arti-
cle.  There he quotes from extra-judicial commentaries  by John Mar-
shall  and Joseph  Story,  and  contends,  more  generally,  that  both
Justices'  views are consistent with his  thesis. 77  Elsewhere,  I raise a
number of questions about Amar's description of their views.
78  Par-
ticularly  unpersuasive,  because  not  adequately  set  in  context,  is
Amar's  quotation  from John  Marshall's  pseudonymous  defense  of
McCulloch v. Maryland. 79  Marshall's  essay there  responds  to  attacks
on  McCulloch  by  Spencer  Roane  (writing  as  "Hampden"),  who
argued  that the Court lacked jurisdiction  to  "adjudicate  .. .away"
the rights of the states.80  Marshall's response was simply that article
III's "arising under" clause gave Congress power to confer appellate
jurisdiction on  the Supreme Court:
How does Hampden elude this provision?  Not by denying that the
case  "arises  under the constitution."  That, not even  he can ven-
ture  to  deny.  How  then  does  he  elude  it?  He  says  that  "these
words  may be otherwise  abundantly  satisfied."-But how  "other-
wise  satisfied,"  he has not told  us; nor can he.  I admit there are
other cases arising under  the constitution.  But the words are "all
and credit, but I  would not have thought that a state court's ruling that the federal
Constitution invalidates another state's law (a kind of vertical, federal/state question)
inevitably  implicates full faith and  credit (which is typically a horizontal, state/state
question).  After  all,  the  Missouri  court's  position-that  a  note  issued  in
consideration  of  paper  of  the  Bank  of  Kentucky  was  void,  because  the  paper
constituted bills of credit prohibit:ed by the federal Constitution-would have  called
for voiding a  Missouri  law authorizing issuance  of such paper  by a  Missouri  bank.
The issue raised is not  whether Missouri paid sufficient  heed to Kentucky's law  (as
distinguished  from  some  other  state's  law),  but  simply  whether  any  state  could
constitutionally issue such paper.  Beyond this, ifAmar's  characterization  were valid,
it would plug the gap in §  25 only in those cases in which state A's courts strike down
the laws of state B as federally invalid, leaving a gap in  § 25 for the presumably more
common cases in which state A's  courts strike down state A's laws.
On a related point, Amar notes that Frankfurter and Landis  "uncovered  'only'
sixteen  cases from  1789 to  1914 ...  in which  the section 25  'gap'  was  successfully
invoked to defeat Supreme Court.jurisdiction."  Amar, supra note 6, at  1531  & n.103
(citing F. FRANKFURTER &J.  LANDIS,  supra note 58, at 190 n.20).  If  16 cases constitute
sparse authority  (a dubious proposition),  the proper lesson may be that few litigants
tried  to  circumvent  a  basic  and  clearly  established  limit on  the  Supreme  Court's
jurisdiction.
77  Amar, Reply, supra note 9, at  1666-67.
78  See supra notes  33,  76; infra note 228.
79  17  U.S.  (4 Wheat.) 316  (1819).
80  JOHN  MARSHALL'S  DEFENSE  OF MCCULLOCH  V. MARYLAND  138 (G.  Gunther ed.
1969)  (reprinting Essay of Hampden, Richmond  Enquirer, June  22,  1819 (authored
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cases"  and  I  deny  that  the word  "some"  can  be  substituted for
"all,"  or that the word "all,"  can be satisfied if any one case can be
withdrawn  from the jurisdiction of the court.81
Marshall was clearly affirming that because article III extends to "all"
cases arising under the Constitution, Congress  does not lack power
to assign the Supreme Court arising under jurisdiction in McCulloch
or any other case-whether  or not it has assigned other portions  of
the "arising  under" jurisdiction  in other  cases.  Even  the language
that on its face seems most favorable to Amar ("if any one case can
be withdrawn  from  the jurisdiction  of the court")  merely criticizes
Hampden's  position,  which  "withdraw[s]"  from  the  scope  of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction under article III power  to decide  dis-
putes  (like McCulloch) concerning  the  extent of national  and state
powers.  Marshall  had no  occasion  to argue that, had Congress not
given the Supreme Court statutory jurisdiction to decide McCulloch,
article III would have been violated, and his words, read in context,
carry no such suggestion.
Amar's  treatment  of  this  passage  illustrates  a  more  general
point:  the passages  from Story and Marshall  on which he relies are
all extra-judicial  expressions  or dicta  discussing situations  in which
Congress had given  the federal  courts jurisdiction in his  mandatory
tier. The testing case, however, is one in which Congressfails to pro-
vide jurisdiction in ihe mandatory  tier.  As  I have just noted,  Mar-
shall  and  Story  participated  in  four  such  cases,  and  each  time
enforced,  without  hesitation,  a  limitation  on  federal  question
jurisdiction.
2.  Admiralty Jurisdiction  and the Saving to Suitors Clause
A second possible gap arises under section 9 of the First Judici-
ary  Act.82  This provision  gives federal  courts exclusive jurisdiction
in admiralty, but saves "to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common
law remedy,  where the common  law  is  competent  to  give it."  The
statute has come to mean that "to all intents and purposes every claim
which  can be enforced  [in federal  court]  in admiralty by an  in per-
sonam  libel  can  be enforced  in  state  courts  [under  the  "saving  to
suitors"  clause]  ...  by action in personam. '"83  If a plaintiff chooses
81  Id at 212  (reprinting  Essay  by  A Friend  of the  Constitution,  Alexandria
Gazette, July 15,  1819  (authored by John Marshall)).
82  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,  § 9,  1 Stat.  73,  76-77.
83  Black, Admiralty  Jurisdiction:  CDitique and  Suggestions, 50 COLUM.  L. Rxv. 259, 265
(1950);  see also  New Jersey  Steam Navigation  Co.  v.  Merchant's  Bank, 47  U.S.  (6
How.)  344, 389-90  (1848);  Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S.  (5  How.) 441, 461  (1847).  See
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the state forum, the defendant may not remove, and in many cases-
particularly before the twentieth century, but even thereafter-there
would be no Supreme Court review.
8 4
This jurisdictional arrangement raises the question whether the
cases filed in state court under the savings clause are cases of "admi-
ralty and maritime" jurisdiction within the meaning of article III.  If
so, the First Judiciary Act included another gap in Amar's mandatory
tier.  Amar argues, however, that these state law actions are by defini-
tion not admiralty cases, and notes that the procedural and substan-
tive  rules  governing  an  in  personam  action  varied  depending  on
whether it was filed  "in admiralty"  or "at common law."8 5  Accord-
ing to  this  view,  what  is  involved  is  not the  description  a-modern
lawyer  would  provide  of concurrent  state  and  federal jurisdiction
over a  single  action,  but rather an understanding  that  a particular
transaction could support  two quite different kinds of actions--one
in admiralty and one at common law.  The law and chancery courts
would not have been viewed  as having  concurrent jurisdiction over
the same case  when a  suitor might  seek  either  damages  or restitu-
tion; rather, each had exclusive jurisdiction over particular remedies.
So, too,  with admiralty and common law courts.
86
generally G.  GILMORE  &  C.  BLACK,  THE  LAW  OF  ADMIRALTY  §  1-13,  at 37-40  (2d ed.
1975);  D.  ROBERTSON,  supra note 30, at  18-19, 27,  123-25.
84  For  more  than  a  century.  the  governing  law  applied  by  state  courts  in
maritime actions was not conceived of asfederal  admiralty law.  See, e.g.,  G. GILMORE  &
C.  BLACK, supra note 83,  § 1-16, at. 45; Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: The Devil's
Own Mess,  1960 Sup.  CT. REV.  158,  159; Fletcher, The General  Common Law and Section
34 of the  Judiciary  Act of 1789:  The Example of Marine Insurance,  97 HARv.  L. REV.  1513,
1550-53  (1984).  Though  the Supreme  Court  could review state court decisions  to
determine  whether they fell within the  scope of the savings  clause or whether  they
conflicted  with  a federal  statute,  see,  e.g.,  Sherlock  v.  Alling,  93  U.S.  99,  101-04
(1876),  there was no general  review of state common law maritime decisions.
Southern  Pacific  Co. v. Jensen,  244 U.S.  205,  215-17  (1917),  and  Chelentis  v.
Luckenbach S.S.  Co., 247 U.S. 372..383-84  (1918),  gave rise to a view of admiralty as
"a  uniform  body of substantive federal  law applicable not only in admiralty courts
but  also  in  the  state  courts  and  on  the  'law  side'  of federal  courts."  HART  &
WECHSLER,  supra note  2,  at  892.  But there have remained  important limits on  the
uniformity doctrine, see,  e.g.,  Wilburn Boat Co. v.  Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S.
310, 316-19  (1955);  D.  ROBERTSON,  supra note  30, at  145-47,  and even  today  the
Supreme Court  lacks  plenary  authority  to  review  a state  court's  legal  and  factual
determinations  in cases  heard under the saving to suitors  clause.
85  See G.  GILMORE  & C.  BLACK, supra note 83,  § 1-9,  at  19,  § 1-13,  at 37.
86  Amar properly notes the uncertainty about the meaning of "maritime"  in the
specification of "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."  To the extent that that phrase
extended beyond admiralty  cases traditionally understood, it is more difficult for him
to argue that cases filed under the "saving to suitors" clause clearly fall outside of the
federal judicial  power.  But  though the addition  of the word  "maritime"  may have
been meant  to  "guard  against  any  narrow  interpretation  of the preceding  word,HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE  II
I think Amar's argument is a plausible one, but I would raise two
questions  about it.  The first is why mandatory federal jurisdiction is
unimportant in common law maritime matters.  AsJustice Story him-
self recognized in both Martin and in his commentaries,8 7 prototypi-
cal in personam suits like maritime tort and contract actions may well
implicate  the concerns  underlying federal jurisdiction in admiralty,
as these suits involve national policy, the rights and duties of foreign-
ers,  intercourse with  foreign states,  and  the law of nations.88  The
presence of those concerns  does not necessarily depend on whether
the plaintiff chooses  to frame his  complaint in admiralty or at com-
mon law.  But this response is a characteristically modern, functional
argument, and two centuries ago a more conceptual vision may have
prevailed.
The second question goes to the wording of the First Judiciary
Act.  If the  conceptual  view  on which  Amar  relies  was  so  entirely
dear, one might ask why the savings clause was  even necessary,  for
on Amar's  account,  an  eighteenth  century  lawyer  would  not  have
imagined that giving the federal courts exclusive power to entertain
"civil  causes  of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" in any way lim-
ited the state courts from entertaining a wholly different  animal, the
suit  at  common  law.  But  statutory  redundancy  for  purposes  of
emphasis  is hardly unknown,  as I noted earlier.
8 9
In the end, Amar does seem to me to have presented a coherent,
if not  entirely unproblematic,  argument  that  the  saving  to  suitors
clause is consistent with his thesis.
3.  Jurisdiction Affecting Ambassadors
Amar concedes that section 13 of the FirstJudiciary Act does not
fully  vest article  III's jurisdiction  affecting  ambassadors  and  other
diplomats.90  His response  is simply to observe, correctly,  that that
'admiralty,'"  3 J. STORY, supra note 5,  § 1666,  at 527; see also Black, supra note 83,  at
262  n.12  (maritime added  to assure  that jurisdiction  was not limited in  the  same
manner  as was  that  of colonial  vice-admiralty  courts),  the  terms  "admiralty"  and
maritime  are  traditionally  understood  to  be  synonymous  in  this  context,  see  G.
GiLmoRE & C. BLACK,  supra note 83, § 1-1,  at 1.
87  See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,  14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816);  3J. STORY,
supra note 5,  §§  1663-65, at 530-33.  But cf.  id.  § 1666, at 533 & n.3 (exclusive federal
jurisdiction  necessary  in prize  cases  but not necessarily  in "many"  other maritime
cases in which common law courts  are competent to provide remedies).
88  See 3  ELLroT's  DEBATES,  supra note 5, at 532 (remarks  ofJames Madison).
89  See supra text accompanying  notes  17-23.
90  See Amar, supra note 6, at 1522.  Article III authorizes jurisdiction in "all cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls."  U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2
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gap is also problematic for traditionalists, though for a different rea-
son.  The  ambassador jurisdiction  is  part of the Supreme  Court's
original jurisdiction,  which,  most  traditionalists  believe,  Congress
cannot limit.9  Hence,  there is a gap not only in Amar's mandatory
tier but also in the original jurisdiction.
Amar proceeds  to argue that the gap is more embarrassing  for
traditionalists  than  it  is  for  him.92  If  the  original  jurisdiction  is
mandatory, it must  be, Amar says,  because  article III  says  that  the
Supreme Court "shall have original Jurisdiction" over the designated
cases.  But, he  continues,  if'  "shall"  is  mandatory  here, it must  be
mandatory  elsewhere in article III-just what traditionalists  deny.93
Comparative embarrassment  is rather difficult  to  calibrate,  but
one could plausibly argue just the opposite.  Amar's  claim  that  the
traditionalists offer inconsistent conclusions about whether the word
"shall"  is mandatory loses force because of the different phrases and
contexts in which  "shall"  appears in article III.  One can easily read
"the judicial  Power shall  extend"  as  referring only  to matters  over
which the federal  courts have  capability  (rather than an obligation),
(emphasis added).  Section  13  of the  First Judiciary  Act  gave  the  Supreme  Court
exclusive jurisdiction  in suits against  ambassadors,  other public  ministers, or their
domestics or domestic  servants, and concurrent jurisdiction  9f all  suits brought by
ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice consul  shall be a
party.  SeeJudiciary  Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13,  1 Stat. 73,  80-81.  Section  13's gaps are
twofold.  First,  it  gave  jurisdiction  only  where  diplomats  or  their  domestics  are
parties;  these  cases,  however,  are  presumably  only  a  subset  of  cases  affecting
diplomats, for otherwise  Congress  would  likely have used the dearer and narrower
definition.  See Osborn  v.  Bank of the  United  States,  22 U.S.  (9 Wheat.)  738,  855
(1824).  But  cf  United  States  v.  Ortega,  24  U.S.  (11  Wheat.)  467,  468  (1826)
(prosecution for offering violence  to the person  of a foreign minister was not a case
"affecting"  the  minister).  Second,  if suits  against domestics  fall  within  article  III,
presumably suits by domestics (not mentioned  in § 13)  do as well.  In addition, suits
brought by (rather than against) consuls or vice-consuls  could be filed in state court,
see Judiciary Act of 1789,  ch. 20,  § 9,  1 Stat. 73, 76-77, with no provision for removal
or review.  See also infra notes  124,  130,  138.
91  See,  e.g.,  Redish,  Power To Regulate, supra note  2,  at 901.  Henry Hart is not
strictly a traditionalist,  as  he suggested  that Congress's  power  over  the  Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction might not be unbridled, but he too thought the original
jurisdiction was  mandatory.  See Hart, supra note 2,  at  1372-73.
A letter from Oliver Ellsworth (signed A Landholder) stated: "[N]othing hinders
...  that all the cases, except the few in which it [the Supreme Court] has original and
not appellate jurisdiction,  may in the first instance  be had in the state courts  . ... "
ESSAYS  ON  THE  CONsTrrurON  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  164  (P.  Ford  ed.  1892)
[hereinafter  ESSAYS  ON  THE  CONsm-rToN]  (reprinting Letter to  Landholders  and
Farmers  from A Landholder  (VI), Conn.  Courant, Dec.  10,  1787).
92  See Amar, supra note 6, at  1524-25.
93  IdHISTORY AND  STRUCTURE  OF ARTICLE III
and the  "judicial Power...  shall be vested in"  as  referring to  the
courts that may  (rather than must) exercise that capability.
By  contrast, the phrase  "shall  have original Jurisdiction"  has a
more imperative  ring, particularly when  the context is  considered.
This  language  appears  in  a  paragraph  distinguishing  between  the
Supreme  Court's  original  and  appellate  jurisdiction.  Article  III
expressly  made  the  appellate  jurisdiction  subject  to  Congress's
power to make exceptions, but gives no such power to limit the origi-
nal jurisdiction.94  The mandatory  quality of the phrase  "shall  have
original Jurisdiction"  is  thus supported  by the absence of congres-
sional power to make  exceptions  to the original jurisdiction.
If the traditionalist  view is  not as  infirm as  Amar suggests,  his
own view poses some serious difficulties.  Unlike traditionalists, who
posit  that  both  categories  of original jurisdiction  are  mandatory,
Amar distinguishes between them.  Only the ambassador jurisdiction
is mandatory, while the state as party jurisdiction could, he says, be
left  to the  state courts  entirely.  The First Judiciary  Act,  however,
points in just the opposite  direction.  It has  gaps in the ambassador
jurisdiction,95 but it fully vests the Supreme Court's original jurisdic-
tion (at least concurrently) when  a state  is a party.96  And in debate
on the Act, Representative  Stone said:
94  Article III provides:
In all Cases  affecting Ambassadors,  other public  Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have
original  Jurisdiction.  In  all  the  other  Cases  before  mentioned,  the
supreme Court shall have appellateJurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations  as the Congress  shall
make.
U.S.  CONsT. art III, § 2.
95  See supra note 90 and accompanying  text.
96  SeeJudiciary  Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13,  1 Stat. 73,  80-81.  Section 13  excludes
cases between a state and its citizens, but the Supreme Court seems clearly correct in
having interpreted article III's grant of original jurisdiction where the state is a party
as referring  only to cases  otherwise  within the judicial  power.  See Pennsylvania  v.
Quicksilver Co.,  77  U.S.  (10  Wall.)  553, 556  (1871).  More  difficult is the  question
whether the jurisdiction  extends  to cases  that are within the judicial power, but not
by virtue of the fact  that the state is a party-as might be true of federal question
cases or cases in which the United States is a party.  The court declined jurisdiction in
the first situation, see California v. Southern Pacific Co.,  157 U.S.  229, 257-62 (1895),
but accepted it in  the second, see United States v.  Texas,  143 U.S.  621  (1892).
That the jurisdiction  is concurrent  only, with no removal to the Supreme Court
authorized should plaintiff file in a different forum,  is hardly unproblematic.  See infra
note  138.
The Court's present day original jurisdiction over cases in which a state is a party
does have one gap: unlike article III, it does not include cases between a state and a
foreign  government. See 28  U.S.C.  § 1251  (1982).  To my knowledge,  no such  suit
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I apprehend  in  every thing  else the  State courts might  have  had
complete  and  adequate  jurisdiction;  the  State  courts  could  not
determine between State and State, because their judgment would
be  ineffectual;  they  could  never  carry  it  into  execution.  But  I
apprehend in all other cases the States could execute that authority
which is reposed  in the United  States."
9 7
The Act and its history thus seem at least as hard to square with
Amar's position as with the  conventional one.
9 8
Amar adds that "one  would be hard pressed indeed to develop
strong structural reasons for seeing all cases in the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction as qualitatively more important than all cases in
its appellate jurisdiction.' " 95 '  I am quite satisfied,  however, with the
traditional  explanation  for  the  original  jurisdiction:  that  federal
jurisdiction  over  another sovereign 00  is  so  sensitive  that  only the
court  of greatest  dignity  should  exercise  it. 10 l  Indeed,  it is  worth
has ever been filed in the Supreme Court, and if it were, the Court would presumably
have jurisdiction only if the defendant consented.  See 3 ELLIOT'S  DEBATES,  supra note
5,  at 533 (remarks ofJames  Madison);  id. at 557  (remarks ofJohn Marshall).  If that
situation  ever  arose,  the  Supreme  Court  might  be  required  to  hold  §  1251
unconstitutional.
97  ANNALS  OF  CONG.,  supra  note  14,  at  840-41;  see  also  id.  at  825;  text
accompanying notes 44-47.
Similar  views  were  expressed  in  the  ratification  debates.  The  essayist
"Candidus,"  thought  to  be  Samuel  Adams  or  his  follower,  Benjamin  Austin, Jr.,
wished to exclude federal question cases from Supreme Court jurisdiction, confining
it instead  to matters  affecting  more  than one sovereign-cases  under  treaties,  the
ambassador jurisdiction,  controversies  between  two  states,  or involving  two  states'
conflicting land grants, admiralty jurisdiction, and offenses against the law of  nations.
See 4 H. STORING,  supra note  19,  al  131-32.
98  See  also  infra notes  124,  1.38  (discussing  the  significance  of the  original
jurisdiction's  being concurrent  in many  instances).
Amar suggests that the  First Judiciary Act cannot  be more embarrassing  to his
view of the original jurisdiction than to the traditional  view.  He properly notes that
any gap in the ambassador jurisdiction embarrasses  both views, but gaps in the state
as party jurisdiction  embarrasses  only  traditionalists.  See Amar, supra note 6,  1525
n.80.  He is  surely right that it  is easier  to satisfy a single condition than to satisfy a
second one as well.  But it is particularly awkward  for his argument that the Act had
gaps in the portion of the original jurisdiction that he claims is mandatory, but not in
the portion that he claims  is non-mandatory.
99  Amar, supra note 6, at  1523.
100  In  the case of the ambassador jurisdiction, jurisdiction that affects  another
sovereign through its diplomatic representatives  is vested in the Supreme Court.  Cf
Davis v.  Packard, 32 U.S.  (7 Pet.)  276 (1833)  (failure to plead consular status in state
court not waived, because privilege belongs to the foreign government rather than to
the official  personally).
101  See, e.g.,  California v.  Arizona,  440 U.S.  59,  65-66  (1979);  Ames  v.  Kansas,
Il1  U.S. 449, 464  (1884);  THE  FEDERALIST No.  81,  supra note  30, at 511;  HART  &
WECHSLER, supra note 2,  at 296; 3J.  STORY, supra note 5,  §  1654, at  522-23.HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE  I
recalling that admiralty jurisdiction-the  least controversial  compo-
nent of the federal judicial power-was  thought necessary  because
maritime matters were  viewed as part of the law of nations, and fre-
quently  affected  foreign sovereigns.  As  for the  sensitivity  of cases
involving  the states, we need  only recall  that the Supreme  Court's
exercise  of  original jurisdiction  in  1793  in  Chisholm v.  Georgia1 2
promptly  led  to  adoption  of  the  eleventh  amendment,  which
restricted the federal courts' power to adjudicate suits against sover-
eign states.
10 3
B.  The Legislative History of the First  Judiciary  Act
The  passage  from Hart &  Wechsler quoted  earlier  questioned
whether  the debate  over the First Judiciary Act recognized  any dis-
tinction  between  Amar's  two  tiers.
10 4  I turn  next to Amar's  claim
that those  debates  contain "considerable  historical  support for the
thesis."' 1 5
1.  General Observations
Amar highlights several aspects of these debates:  (i) some repre-
sentatives urged their colleagues, when passing a statute establishing
the entire federal judiciary, to view the matter as a whole; 1° '  (ii) Rep-
resentative  Smith observed that the creation  of lower courts might
limit the number of appeals from the state courts that the Supreme
Court would  otherwise hear;' 1 7 (iii) many statesmen urged that the
federal courts' power be coextensive with the scope of federal law;' 08
(iv) several  comments  emphasized  the importance of federal  ques-
tion jurisdiction;'0 9  and  (v) some in Congress  were wary  of relying
102  2  U.S. (2  Dall.) 419, 431  (1793).
103  One need not accept the traditional  state sovereignty theory of the eleventh
amendment  in making  this point.  See  Hans v.  Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1 (1890).  The
amendment's  diversity explanation,  expressed in Atascadero  State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234,  247-302  (1985)  (Brennan, J., dissenting),  which both Amar and I find
persuasive, see Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96  YALE L.J.  1425,  1481-84  (1987)
[hereinafter Amar, Sovereignty], is also consistent with recognition of states as having
special  sovereign  status.  For  a  lucid  and  helpful  summary  and  discussion,  see
Fletcher,  The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment:  A  Reply  to  Critics, 56  U.
CHi.  L. REv.  1261  (1989).
104  See supra text accompanying  note  13.
105  Amar, supra note 6, at 1547.
106  See id. at  1547-48.
107  See id. at 1559-60; see also infra text accompanying  notes  126-28.
108  See  Amar,  supra note  6,  at  1563-65.  Amar  repeatedly  emphasizes  the
"coextensiveness  principle"  in his article. See,  e.g.,  id. at  1511-12,  1539,  1557.
109  See id. at  1548-53,  1557-59.
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too heavily on the organs of state government."o  Amar argues, cor-
rectly, that these views are consistent with his  thesis.
The difficulty,  however, is  that they are equally consistent with
an entirely non-mandatory view of article III, for each statement can
easily be read as a policy argument about how Congress's broad con-
stitutional prerogative  ought to  be exercised.  These  statements  do
not undercut  Amar's thesis,  but they do not support it.
2.  Specific  Evidence
Amar's  more specific  efforts  to  find support  in the debates  for
the two-tier thesis  rely heavily  on  the statements  of Representative
Smith and Senator Maclay in the first Congress."'  Both men, how-
ever, misunderstood article III as precluding state courts from hear-
ing any cases within the federal judicial power. 112  Holding that view,
it is  not surprising that they thought  Congress  was obliged  to vest
jurisdiction  in the "inferior"  federal  courts.
113
Unlike Amar," 4  I do not think that basic misconception can  be
severed  from their mandatory  reading of the "shall  be vested"  lan-
guage.  If the state courts could not hear any of the cases described
in article III, then Congress's failure to vest jurisdiction in the infer-
ior federal  courts  would  preclude  any  adjudication  of these  cases
(except those few falling within  the Supreme  Court's  original juris-
diction)-a far  more serious matter than leaving various categories
to the state courts for adjudication.
As for the two-tier thesis, Smith mentions  the word "all"  once,
in the following passage discussing a proposal to limit lower federal
court jurisdiction to admiralty cases:
10  See id. at  1565.
111  See id. at  1548-54.
112  See ANNALS  OF CONG., supra note  14, at 819 (remarks of Rep. Smith)  ("IT]he
Constitution,  in  the plainest  and  most unequivocal  language,  preclude[s]  us from
allotting any part of the Judicial  authority of the Union to the State judicature.");  9
DOCUMENTARY  HISTORY  OF THE  FIRST FEDERAL  CONGRESS  OF THE  UNITED  STATES  OF
AMERICA  87  (K.  Bowling  & H. Veit  eds.  1988)  (reprinting The  Diary of William
Maclay)  [hereinafter Diary of William Maclay].  Smith also appears  to have believed
that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction  was limited to reviewing federal, and
not state court, decisions. See ANNALS  OF CONG., supra note  14, at 818. But cf. id. at 819
(If  a  state  court  usurps  a  federal  court's  exclusive  jurisdiction,  the  "National
tribunal"  must possess  power to protect  the Union's rights.).
113  See ANNALS  OF  CONG.,  supra note  14,  at  801,  817;  Diary of William  Maclay,
supra note  112,  at 87; see also Casto, supra note 55, at  1110 n.70.  Others in  the first
Congress,  however,  expressed  the opposite view.  See supra note  15.
114  See Amar, supra note 6, at  1553.HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE III
It  is  declared  by  [article  III]  that  the judicial  power  of the
United  States shall be vested in one supreme, and in such inferior
courts  as  Congress  shall from  time  to time  establish.  Here  is no
discretion,  then,  in  Congress  to  vest  the judicial  power  of the
United States in any other than the Supreme Court and the inferior
courts of the United  States.  It is further declared  that the judicial
power of the United  States shall extend  to all cases of a particular
description.  How is that power to be administered?  Undoubtedly
by the tribunals  of the United  States; if the judicial  power of the
United States extends to those specified  cases, it follows  indisputa-
bly that the tribunals of the United States must likewise extend  to
them  . . . [Congress  cannot]  assign the jurisdiction  of some  of
these very cases to the State courts .... 115
Smith  does  not  clearly  distinguish  among  the  nine  heads  of
jurisdiction,  or recognize  that  "all"  modifies  only  some  of them.
Moreover,  earlier that day in the same debate, he stated (without dis-
tinguishing subject-matter from party-based jurisdiction) that "those
causes  which, by the Constitution are declared to belong to thejudi-
cial courts  of the United States,"  cannot be left exclusively to state
court determination. 1 6  In the considerable  discussion that ensued,
no other representative mentioned the distinction that Amar finds in
Smith's comments.  All in all, I think it more plausible to read Smith
as suggesting that the whole judicial power, and not  just Amar's first-
tier, must be vested in  the federal courts.1 17
Much  the  same  is  true  of Senator  Maclay.  Amar quotes  this
excerpt  from his  diaries:  "But  the Constitution  expressly extended
[federal jurisdiction]  to all cases in law and equity under the Consti-
tution[,]  the Laws of the united States, Treaties made or to be made.
&ca."' 8  The notation "&ca."  is profoundly ambiguous; does it refer
only  to  the subject matter  clauses, or to the entire judicial power?
Maclay's entry the following day seems to support the latter reading.
He  wrote:  "[I]f  any  matter  made  cognizable  in  a  federal  Court,
should be agitated in a State Court, a plea to the Jurisdiction would
immediately be put in,  and proceedings  would be stayed." '  "  This
entry,  to  be sure, follows  a discussion  of federal  question jurisdic-
tion; it could, but need not, be read as referring only to those cases.
On balance, however, it seems that Maclay, like Smith, did not clearly
115  ANNALS  OF  CONG., supra note  14, at 801  (emphasis added).
116 Id. at 798.
117  See Clinton, Early Implementation, supra note 6, at  1534-40.
118  Diary of William  Maclay, supra note  112, at 85.  -
119  Id. at 87.
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articulate  the distinction  on which Amar rests, if he articulated it at
all. 120
In sum,  the historical  grounding  for  the two-tier thesis  in  the
provisions of,  and debates surrounding, the FirstJudiciary Act seems
to me shaky at best.
III.  MANDATORY  VESTING  AND  THE SUPREME  COURT'S  ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION
Having mentioned  the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, I
would like to explore more generally how Amar understands  article
III's assignment of two  categories of cases to the Supreme Court for
trial.  This  question  is  not  a  detour from  consideration  of Amar's
two-tier thesis.  Amar  contends  that a proper understanding  of the
original jurisdiction reinforces his thesis.' 2 '  The traditional view of
the original jurisdiction, however,  poses  a difficulty for Amar.  The
original jurisdiction extends not only to cases affecting ambassadors
but also  to cases  in which a state is a party.  Thus, under the tradi-
tional  view  of  the  original  jurisdiction  as  mandatory,  article  III
requires  the federal judiciary (more specifically,  the Supreme Court)
to  exercise jurisdiction  over  some  party-based  cases-cases  that,
under Amar's view,  fall within the non-mandatory tier.
Not surprisingly, Amar rejects the view that the original jurisdic-
tion is itself mandatory.  Instead, following his two-tier thesis, Amar
contends  that  the  original jurisdiction  in  cases  affecting  ambassa-
dors, because it is modified by the word "all,"  has to be vested in the
120  Amar also  finds  "modest"  additional  support in  a  passage in  the notes  of
Senator William  Paterson,  which  reads, somewhat  cryptically:  "The  Constn. points
out a Number of Articles,  which  the federal  Courts must take  up."  See Amar, supra
note 6, at  1554-55.  Amar interprets  this language  as suggesting that his first-tier  is
mandatory, while Professor Gasto reads it as suggesting that the original jurisdiction
is mandatory.  See Casto, supra note 55, at  1108 n.56.
Neither interpretation  is wholly implausible.  IfI wished to take issue with Amar,
I would point out that (i)  the next sentence in the notes reads,  "The objects are not
different-they  legislate  upon Persons  and  Things,"  id. at  1132,  which  might  be
understood  as  undercutting  a  distinction  between  subject-matter  and  party-based
heads  of jurisdiction;  (ii)  Paterson's  arguments  seem  to  focus  on  questions  of
expediency, not constitutionality, see id. at 1138; and (iii) Paterson employs categories
(for example,  federal  crimes and federal  revenue  cases)  not congruent with  article
III,  see  id. at  1129.  More  importantly,  however,  the  obscurity  of  this  fragment
(apparently made in preparation for a speech, see id. at  1127,  1133),  and the absence
of a comparable passage in the notes of the speech itself, see id. at  1133-35, make it
rather thin support for Amar.
121  See Amar, supra note 6, at  1522-25.HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE  OF ARTICLE  III
federal judiciary,  while  the  state-as-party jurisdiction,  which  is  not
similarly modified,  does not.122
But  why  is  either  of  these  two  categories  singled  out,  from
among  all of the  heads of jurisdiction  in  article III  for trial in  the
Supreme Court?  Amar places heavy emphasis, in this and in an ear-
lier article, on  a geographical  explanation  for the original jurisdic-
tion:  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  and any  state-as-party  cases that
Congress  may  designate for federal adjudication,  must be  triable in
the  Supreme  Court because  it will,  presumably,  be located  in  the
nation's  seat of government. 123   (I use  the word  "triable"  because
Amar would permit the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to  be
concurrent with the inferior federal courts, so long as the defendant
could remove from an inferior court to the Supreme Court.)124
122  See Amar,  Original  Jurisdiction, supra note  1, at 479-80.  He  again  invokes
Justice Story, quoting the first of the following three sentences  from his opinion in
Martin:
It  is  declared  that  "in  all  cases  affecting  ambassadors,  &c.,  that  the
supreme court shall have original jurisdiction."  Could congress withhold
original jurisdiction  in these cases  from the supreme  court?  The clause
proceeds---"in  all  the  other cases  before mentioned  the supreme  court
shall  have  appellate  jurisdiction,  both  as  to  law  and  fact,  with  such
exceptions,  and under such regulations, as the congress shall make."
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,  14  U.S.  (Wheat.) 304, 332 (1816),  quoted in Amar, Original
Jurisdiction,  supra note  1, at 485.  Amar suggests that notwithstanding  the "&c.,"  the
first sentence refers  only to ambassador  cases,  not to state as party cases.  But the
third sentence-"the  clause proceeds"-suggests  that Story's first sentence referred
to the entire first sentence of the second paragraph of article III, § 2 (which includes
the state-as-party jurisdiction),  while  Story's third sentence referred  to the immedi-
ately subsequent language in § 2:  "In all other cases ....  See supra note 94 (quoting
the pertinent  language  from article III).  Thus, to me,  at least, Story's views  about
original jurisdiction are more in line with the traditionalists than with Amar.  See also
Sager, supra note 3,  at 24.
123  See Amar, Original  Jurisdiction,  supra note  1, at 479-80; Amar, supra note 6, at
1559-62.
124  See Amar, Original  Jurisdiction,  supra note  1, at 487 n.204, 492 n.219; Amar,
Neo-Federalist View,  supra note  1, at  261  n.183.  Thus,  no  case within  the  original
jurisdiction  could  be finally resolved  by  a  lower federal court  unless  both parties
accepted the concurrent  forum.  See supra note 7.
Amar recognizes that the FirstJudiciary  Act provided for concurrent jurisdiction
in the lower federal  courts in some ambassador cases without expressly authorizing
removal to the Supreme Court.  That arrangement, he suggests, may itself have been
unconstitutional  unless  the  Supreme  Court  were  viewed  as  having  removal
jurisdiction under article III itself, as supplemented  by § 14 of the FirstJudiciary  Act,
seeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14,  1 Stat. 73, 81-82  (the original version of today's
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.  § 1651  (1982)).  See Amar, OriginalJurisdiction,  supra note  1, at
492 n.219.
One further qualification  is  necessary  in  describing Amar's  views.  Under the
First Judiciary  Act,  suits  brought  by  foreign  diplomats  were  not  in  the  exclusive
federal jurisdiction,  and if  filed  in state  court, there was  no express  provision  for
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One could respond to Amar's geographical explanation  by ask-
ing:  Why  didn't the framers just include a venue provision limiting
suit to any federal court sitting in the seat of government, rather than
confining adjudication  to the Supreme Court?  Article III, after all,
does  include venue  provisions  governing  criminal prosecutions.
125
Beyond  that perhaps  too  easy rejoinder,  Amar's  evidence  that  the
original jurisdiction had an important geographical basis seems a bit
weak.
Amar cites  evidence, in  the ratification  debates, of considerable
concern  that the Supreme Court, distant from the outer reaches  of
the nation, might prove to be an inconvenient  forum.  To me, how-
ever, the pertinent question is not simply whether the framers were
concerned about convenience.  It is, rather, whether there is any evi-
dence that anyone viewed the Supreme Court as being more, rather
than less, convenient  as a trial forum for cases in  the original juris-
diction.  On that score, evidence  is lacking-though, as Amar prop-
erly  notes,  in  general  the  evidence  about  original jurisdiction  is
scanty. 126
removal.  SeeJudiciary  Act of 1789,  ch.  20,  §§ 9,  13,  1 Stat.  73,  76-77,  80-81.  He
concedes  that this arrangement  conflicts  with  his theory of mandatory  vesting, but
suggests  (without endorsing the view)  that the first Congress may  have understood
the ambassadorjurisdiction as designed to protect diplomats, a protection they could
waive by filing in state court.  See Amar, Neo-Federalist  View, supra note  1, at 261  n.183;
infra note  130.
125  See U.S.  CONsT. art. III, § 2,  cl.  3.
126  Amar, sura note 6, at 1561)  n.222.  Amar speculates that the Supreme Court
was an appropriate forum, or at least a less inappropriate forum, in ambassador cases
because it would be geographically  convenient for foreign  dignitaries who had been
received  by the  President in  the  seat of government,  and who  could  communicate
promptly  with  executive  officials  about  late-breaking  developments.  See  Amar,
Original Jurisdiction, supra note  1,  at  476.  This  suggestion  is  ingenious,  if  not
evidenced in any contemporary sources, but one is  again tempted to ask why a venue
requirement would not serve the same purpose.  Moreover, consuls were expected to
reside  outside  of  the  capital,  see  infra  note  129,  making  the  Supreme  Court  a
particularly  inconvenient forum.  As ChiefJustice  Taney explained:
It could hardly have been the intention of the statesmen who framed our
constitution,  to require that one of our citizens who had a petty  claim of
even less than five dollars against another citizen,  who had  been clothed
by  some  foreign  government  with  the  consular  office,  should  be
compelled to go into the supreme court to have ajury summoned in order
to enable him to recover it  ....
Gittings  v.  Crawford,  10  F. Cas.  447, 451  (C.C.D. Md.  1838)  (No.  5,465).  Though
article II,  §  3,  states that the President "shall  receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers"  but  not  consuls,  perhaps  because  the  last  were  expected  to  reside
throughout the nation, article III's grant of original jurisdiction  does not distinguish
between  consuls and other foreign officials.
For controversies to which a state is a party, litigation in the capital would also beHISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE 116
Amar's  other  evidence  for his  "geographic"  theory is  the con-
cern expressed, in the debates  over the First Judiciary Act, about the
possible  inconvenience  resulting  from  federal  jurisdiction.  There
were objections to the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over non-citi-
zen defendants; Maine was included in the nearby federal district for
New  Hampshire  rather  than  in  that  for  Massachusetts,  of which
Maine  was  then a  part;  the vicinage  principle  in criminal  prosecu-
tions  was  protected.' 27  All  of this evidence,  however,  pertains  to
these  quite  different matters,  not  to  the  Supreme Court's  original
jurisdiction.  And it is hardly remarkable that Congress was attentive
to  questions  of  convenience  when  constructing  the  national
judiciary.
128
Quite  apart  from  its uncertain  historical  foundation,  the  geo-
graphical  theory seems  to me to  lack explanatory  power.  Consider
first the ambassador jurisdiction.  Suppose a foreign consul living in,
Boston had business dealings that gave rise to litigation between him
convenient, Amar suggests, as each state would have legislative representatives  "who
could be relied on to attend to the state's litigation interests."  Amar, OriginalJurisdic-
tion, supra note 1, at 476.  His observation that federal legislators played notable roles
in a number of notable cases, see Amar, supra note 6, at 1560 n. 222-even if strength-
ened  to show that in a large percentage  of original jurisdiction  cases, a state was
represented (or attended to) by one of its legislators-may confuse the reason for the
original jurisdiction with its effect.  Once thatjurisdiction was established, a state may
have found in many cases that there was no more convenient arrangement for repre-
sentation than reliance on its legislators.  That evidence does not show, however, that
the original jurisdiction  was established because the framers thought litigation before
the Supreme Court was expected to be so convenient that Congress  should be pre-
cluded from assigning the cases exclusively  to any other federal court.  Indeed,  in a
dispute between Massachusetts and a Connecticut citizen, it seems very doubtful that
litigation  in  the  capital  (away  from  the  witnesses,  state  government  officials,  and
many  of the most likely  counsel) was  obviously more  convenient  than in a federal
court  closer  to  home-perhaps  one in Rhode  Island if those in  Massachusetts  or
Connecticut  were not sufficiently impartial.  See also infra note 138.
127  See Amar, supra note 6, at 1559-63  & n.223 (citingJ. GOEBEL,  HISTORY  OF THE
SUPREME  COURT OF THE  UNrED  STATES:  ANTECEDENTS  AND  BEGINNINGS  TO  1801,  at
460, 471, 497, 500,  507 (1971)).
128  Amar's geographic explanation of the original jurisdiction does not seem to
be advanced by his observation that some of the framers defended the circuit court's
jurisdiction  as reducing the number  of appeals  from state courts  that the Supreme
Court would have to entertain, see Amar, OriginalJurisdiction,  supra note  1, at 471-72;
see also infra note  181,  and that William Paterson noted  the greater  convenience  of
relying  not  on  the  Supreme  Court alone  but on  lower federal  courts  distributed
throughout  the  states,  see Amar,  supra  note  6,  at  1559-60.  Again,  it seems  quite
unexceptional that the first Congress would have tried to make the federal judiciary a
convenient  mechanism.  That  inferior  court  trial jurisdiction  might  prove  more
convenient  than Supreme  Court appellate jurisdiction hardly  shows  that article III
established the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for geographic  reasons.
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and  a  Massachusetts  citizen. 2 9  Amar  suggests  that  although  the
lower  federal  courts  could  not  exercise  exclusive jurisdiction  over
the suit, they could be given jurisdiction that was concurrent with the
Supreme Court. At least if the public consul so chose, 30  suit would
have  to  be  in the Supreme  Court-even  if both parties  and  all the
evidence  resided  in  Massachusetts.  Particularly  under  eighteenth
century transportation  conditions, the Supreme Court would be a far
less convenient forum than  a lower federal  court in Massachusetts.
Next,  consider  the jurisdiction where  a  state  is  a party.  Here,
Amar  uses  the  example  of suits  between  two  states.  He  is  surely
right  that if  a  lower  federal  court  tried  to  resolve  such  a dispute,
"[o]ne  of the two states would enjoy an unseemly 'home field' advan-
tage."' 31  But this concern  about home field advantage would seem
to be as forceful in other cases outside of the Supreme Court's origi-
nal jurisdiction:  for example, a suit in lower federal  court in Massa-
chusetts involving a conflict between Massachusetts and Connecticut
land grants (whether or not both  litigants were citizens of Massachu-
setts). 132  Indeed,  his  concern would  be most  sharply implicated  if
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts  tried to sue the State of Con-
necticut in Massachusetts  state court.1 3 3  But Amar reads article III
as  permitting such  a suit,  because  disputes  between  two  states are
not within his mandatory tier.  The concern about home field advan-
tage  thus  does  not provide  a  coherent  explanation  for  the  results
reached under Amar's account.
129  There is little doubt that consuls were expected to reside outside of the seat
of government.  See,  e.g.,  5 J.  MOORE,  A DIGEST  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAw  § 700, at  19
(1906);  7 TREATIES  AND  OTHER  INTERNATIONAL  AGREEMENTS  OF THE UNITED  STATES
OF AMERICA,  1776-1949,  at 773  (C. Bevans ed.  1968);Johnson, The Early Histoy of the
United States Consular Service. 1776-1792.,  13  POL.  SCI.  Q.  19,  26-27  (1898).  I  thank
Detlev Vagts for leading  me to these sources.
130  Amar  hints  at  the  possibility  that  the  ambassador jurisdiction  could  be
viewed as protecting diplomats only, and hence waivable by them if they preferred to
sue in  state court.  See supra note  1:24.  But this  view  (which Amar sketches without
endorsing)  poses some difficulties.  It is hard to affirm that the Supreme Court was
given original jurisdiction for venue reasons when,  as  in  the  example posed in the
text, that forum was obviously less convenient for both parties, even if the diplomat
might prefer it for strategic reasons  (as when his resources far exceeded those of his
adversary).  In the ratification debates, anti-federalist writers objected to the original
jurisdiction  over  diplomats  because  of  its  possible  inconvenience  for  their
adversaries.  See,  e.g.,  2  H. STORING,  supra note  19,  at 69,  431.
131  Amar, Original  Jurisdiction,  supra note  1, at 477.
132  See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,  sup-a note 5, at 481 (remarks ofJames Wilson);  3 id.
at 523  (remarks  of George  Mason);  4  id. at  159  (remarks of William  Davie);  3 J.
STORY, supra note 5,  § 1690, at 567.
133  See supra text accompanying  notes 44-47.HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE  1I  1
Moreover, the original jurisdiction extends to numerous cases in
which only one party is a state.134  If I understand Amar's view, Con-
gress could not assign a suit by the state of Massachusetts  against a
Connecticut citizen, or against an alien,  exclusively to a lower court
in Massachusetts.  Because only the Supreme Court would constitute
a neutral federal tribunal, each side could insist that the Court try the
dispute.135  But Amar also  argues that Congress  is free to refuse to
vest jurisdiction in the federal judiciary  at all, leaving the suit to be
heard  in  a  Massachusetts  state  court,  without  any  federal  review,
even over the individual defendant's  objection.  That pair of results
seems quite puzzling under a venue-based theory,' 36 and create ten-
134  Amar suggests  that insofar as cases in which  the state is a party are today
viewed  as  particularly  momentous,  it  is  "because  those  cases  do  often  involve
important constitutional issues."  Amar, Original  Jurisdiction,  supra note 1,  at 486.  The
point has some force, given the enactment of the Bill of Rights  and  the fourteenth
amendment,  and the subsequent incorporation  of nearly all  of the amendments  in
the Bill of Rights  (though the eleventh amendment, of course, limits suits nominally
against states).  But in 1787 or 1789, a more typical suit would, I suspect, have been a
debt action against a state, like Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)  419 (1793),  or a
suit involving disputes about real property.  See also 4 H. STORING, supra note 19, at 78
(Letter of Agrippa).  These  suits were  thought  to be important by  the framers  for
quite different  reasons.
135  See Amar, Original  Jurisdiction,  supra note 1, at 492  n.219.
136  A possible response to the anomaly is that article III is more concerned with
the integrity  and fairness  of federal  courts  than  of state  courts.  Indeed,  a similar
argument  is  sometimes  made  in  explaining  why  article  III's  tenure  and  salary
protection  does  not extend  to  state court judges.  See Fallon,  Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative  Agencies, andArticle I,  101 HARV.  L. REv. 915, 941  (1988) ("In a federal
system,  there is no anomaly in the national Constitution's setting a higher standard
for the courts of the national government  than it imposes on state courts.").  Amar
clearly rejects the argument that the salary and tenure clause has this conditional "if
and when"  quality, for such a position would conflict with a number of his structural
principles-most notably his argument that federal adjudication must be coextensive
with the scope of federal law.  See infra text accompanying  notes  164-69.  He asserts,
however, that "home field  advantage"  is of concern  only "if and when"  the federal
courts hear the case.  See infra text accompanying notes  173-76.
I understand his position, though I think it suffers  from some difficulties.  The
most striking question, as just noted in the text, is why the framers would have been
so concerned  about federal court venue as to constitutionalize  it, while being utterly
indifferent  to the stronger home-field  advantage of state courts.  And I have trouble
reading the statements  of eighteenth  century  statesmen  in support of the  state-as-
party jurisdiction as being consistent with this kind of "if and when"  understanding.
See infra text accompanying note 137 (Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No. 81); see also 3
ELLIOT'S  DEBATES,  supra  note  5,  at 532-34  (remarks of  James  Madison)  (defending
federal jurisdiction  in suits between a state and a foreign nation by asking:  "Ought it
to be put in the power of a member of the Union to drag the whole community into
war?"); 4 it.  at 159  (remarks of William Davie of North Carolina) ("It is impossible
that there should  be impartiality when  a party affected  is  to be judge."); supra text
accompanying  note 97  (statement  of Representative  Stone  in  the  first  Congress);
infra text accompanying  notes 172-76.
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sion with most of article III's party-based jurisdictions, whose prem-
ise is that a state's courts are more likely to be partial to the state or its
citizens  than are the local federal  courts.
Hamilton expressed  his understanding of the party-based juris-
dictions  quite simply:
No man ought certainly  to be a judge in his  own cause,  or in any
case in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.  This prin-
ciple has no inconsiderable weight in designating the federal courts
as  the  proper  tribunals  for  the  determination  of controversies
between  different  States and  their citizens.
137
That view seems to me hard to square with Amar's view that the state
courts, but not  the lower  federal  courts,  are free  to  entertain  such
actions. 138
In  the  end,  Amar's  geographical  explanation  of the  original
jurisdiction seems to me  to lack persuasive power.
IV.  OF CONSTITUTIONAL  HISTORY  AND  STRUCTURE
A.  The Sinificance of the History
What  should one  make  of the  historical  record,  however  one
reads it?  Amar suggests,  if only by implication, that the persuasive-
ness of his thesis depends heavily upon its grounding in the debates
of 1787-89 and its consistency with the First Judiciary Act.  He does
admit that "the Act is perhaps not perfectly consistent, in every jot and
137  THE FEDERALIST  No. 80, sup-a note 30, at 502-03.
138  The First Judiciary  Act granted  the Supreme  Court-  non-exclusive  original
jurisdiction over some cases falling within both the ambassador and the state-as-party
jurisdiction,  without  any  express  provision  authorizing  removal  from a concurrent
forum.  The prospect that cases within the original jurisdiction might be finally tried
in a concurrent  forum,  at least absent consent by all parties,  see supra note 7,  poses
difficulties  for  both  Amar's  view  and  for  the  traditional  view  of  the  original
jurisdiction.
If a suit  between  a state  and  a  non-citizen  is  litigated  in  state court,  see,  e.g.,
Plaquemines  Tropical Fruit Co.  v.  Henderson,  170  U.S. 511  (1898),  as  § 13 of the
First Judiciary  Act permitted,  a problem is posed for the traditional explanation, but
not for Amar, since  such  a  case  falls  outside  his mandatory  tier.  If such  a  suit is
instead  litigated in  a federal  district  court, see,  e.g.,  United  States  v. California, 328
F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1964),  a problem  is presented for both Amar and traditionalists.
Similarly, when  a suit  falling  within the  "ambassador"  jurisdiction  is  litigated
either  in  state  court  (as  the  First Judiciary  Act  permitted  in  actions  brought  by
diplomats, seeJudiciary Act of 1789,  ch. 20,  §§ 9,  13,  1 Stat. 73, 76-77, 80-81, or in a
lower federal court (as the Act permitted in all cases against consuls and vice-consuls,
see id.) a problem is presented for both Amar and for traditionalists. But cf supra note
130 (noting possible argument that ambassador may waive the right to litigate in the
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tittle, with the two-tier thesis '   and adds that "few things in life-
and especially in law-are perfect."' 140  But he repeatedly insists that
the correspondence  is really rather good, 14 1 insisting that the incon-
sistencies  "are  not  truly  'significant.'  -142  For  me, Amar's  thesis
remains powerful despite its significant discontinuities within the Act
and the pertinent constitutional and legislative debate.
My  point is not simply the familiar one that questions  the pri-
macy, or even the coherence, of "originalist"  approaches to constitu-
tional interpretation. 14   It is, rather,  that the other most plausible
theories about article III also have a hard time explaining some piece
of the relevant history.
Consider, for example, the theory that the Constitution forbids
Congress  from  impairing  the  Supreme  Court's "essential  role"-a
role sometimes  elaborated  as  discharging  the  "essential  functions"
of ensuring  the  supremacy  and uniformity of federal  law.'44  This
theory lacks historical and textual support, is difficult to square with
the limited review provided by section 25,'  and must confront  the
139  Amar, supra note 6,  at  1516.
140  Id
141  See id  at 1516,  1517,  1533-34,  1538-39,  1541,  1542,  1547.
142  Id. at 1516.
143  See, e.g.,  Bittker, The Bicentennial of  theJurisprudence  of Original  Intent:  The Recent
Past, 77 CALIF. L. REV.  235, 258-74 (1989);  Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original
Understanding,  60  B.U.L. REV.  204,  205 (1980).
144  The argument's  source was  Henry Hart's comment, in his famous  Dialogue,
that Congress's  power under the  exceptions  clause cannot be used to "destroy  the
essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan."  See Hart, supra note 2,
at  1365.  Leonard  Ratner  has formulated  this notion  in the  more developed  form
elaborated  in  the  text.  See  Ratner,  Congressional Power, supra note  65,  at  200-01;
Ratner, Majoritarian  Constraints  on Judicial  Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court
Jurisdiction, 27  VILL.  L.  REV.  929,  933-36  (1982)  [hereinafter  Ratner,  Majoritarian
Constraints].
145  See supra text accompanying notes 56-76. The one-way scope of § 25 may be
less embarrassing for the essential functions  theorists than for Amar, since  they can
argue that unless the various  state courts  uniformly recognized  a particular federal
right, eventually the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review the issue and
establish  a uniform rule of decision.  See Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints, supra note
144, at 957.  Amar's theory, by contrast, requires that an article III court review (or at
least have jurisdiction to review)  every case.
The uniformity prong of the essential functions  thesis faces  a second  difficulty,
one not faced by Amar.  Under the FirstJudiciary Act, federal criminal cases were not
reviewable  as  of  right,  but  only  through  the  limited  writ  of habeas  corpus.  See
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14,  1 Stat. 73,  81-82.  TheJudiciary Act of 1802, ch.
31,  2  Stat.  156,  provided  a  second  but also  limited  review mechanism-review  of
certified questions when the judges of the circuit court were divided.  This structure
necessarily  limited  the  capacity  promptly  to  achieve  uniformity,  but  raises  no
problem  for Amar, whose  theory requires  only  that some federal court hear  these
cases.
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hard  question  whether  the  widely  shared  expectation  that  the
Supreme Court  would serve  as the ultimate arbiter on questions  of
federal law is "tantamount to a constitutional limitation on congres-
sional authority over appellate jurisdiction."'
146
The  traditional  position-that  Congress  has  unlimited  power
over federal court jurisdiction (aside from the Supreme Court's orig-
inal jurisdiction)-also presents  some difficulties.  In affirming  Con-
gress's  power to  restrict Supreme  Court appellate jurisdiction, this
view must  assign  great weight  to  the  exceptions  clause,  which  was
rather inconspicuous in the constitutional debate, at least in the Con-
vention itself.'47  Traditionalists must also  deal with the arguments
on which the other theories rely heavily: the important role that dele-
gates to the Convention expected the Supreme Court to play (a point
emphasized  by  essential functions  theorists),  and the range of tex-
tual,  historical,  and  structural  arguments  emphasized  by  Amar
(including particularly the :framers'  concerns  about the trustworthi-
ness  of untenured  state court judges).
A more specific question about the significance of history is this:
How telling an objection is the lack of fit between Amar's interpreta-
tion  and the  First Judiciary  Act?  An important tradition  treats  the
constitutional views  of members of the first  Congress  as entitled  to
great respect.  ' 48  But one thing I have learned from delving into the
surviving records of debates about the Act is how many of the par-
ticipants  were  confused.  (The  same  could  be  said  about  earlier
debates  over article III itself.)  The confusion  may be less attributa-
ble to the legislators' being ill-informed than to the content of article
III, which does not seem to have been clearly thought through and is
surely not a model of draftsmanship.  Indeed, it is that lack of clarity
which  provides  such  fertile  ground  for  the  cultivation  of  rival
accounts  of article III.
Perhaps  the most  fundamental  example  of confusion  involves
the question whether article III obliges Congress  to create lower fed-
eral courts or give them jurisdiction over any particular matters.  The
history of the Convention clearly shows that the answer is no;
14 9 this
is  one  point  that  would  command  agreement  from  Amar,  from
"essential  functions"  theorists like Hart and Ratner, and from tradi-
tionalists  like Bator, Gunther, and  Wechsler.  Yet in  the first  Con-
146  Gunther, supra note 2,  at 906. See generally id. at 901-10; Bator, supra note 2,
at  1030,  1038-41;  Redish, Power to Regulate, supra note 2,  at 906-13.
147  On the origins of the clause, see infra text accompanying  notes  193-96.
148  See supra note  55 and accompanying  text.
149  See  HART  &  WECHSLER, supra note 2,  at  10-11.HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE III
gress  (and,  incidentally,  in  the  ratification  debates),  it  was  not
uncommon  to hear just the opposite asserted.' 50
In addition to confusion, the congressional debates exhibited an
uncertain mix of constitutional interpretation and sub-constitutional
arguments about policy and politics. Though some members did dis-
tinguish between desirability and constitutionality, 5' many speeches
were in the far more ambiguous parlance of necessity or desirability.
Furthermore,  today's  congressional  debates  are uncertain  evi-
dence  of contemporary  constitutional  understandings.' 52  Similar
caution is equally appropriate in looking back to  1789, when the new
legislators  may have been re-fighting old battles about the Constitu-
tion," 5 '  unwilling  to  carry  out  any  constitutional  imperatives  they
divined."'
I do  not mean to  suggest  that  the First Judiciary  Act,  and the
debates that gave rise to it, are not important elements  of constitu-
tional argument about article III's meaning.  They are, and hence the
question  of how Amar's  thesis  squares  with  the Act  is  well  worth
careful  consideration.  But evidence  of substantial tension  between
his thesis and the Act is not an interpretive trump that by itself shows
Amar's  thesis to be unfounded.
Amar at times offers a similar view of the importance of the First
150  See, e.g.,  ANNALS  OF CONG., supra note 14,  at 827-28  (remarks of Rep. Gerry);
supra text accompanying notes 111-20  (discussing views  of Representative Smith and
Senator Maclay  in the  first Congress).  On the ratification  debates,  see  2  ELLIoT'S
DEBATES,  supra  note  5,  at  551  (Committee  of  Maryland  Convention  approved
proposed amendment  to the  Constitution to "give  a concurrent jurisdiction  to the
state courts,  in order that Congress may not be compelled,  as they will be under the
present form, to establish inferior federal courts");  Hanson, Remarks on  the Proposed
Plan of a Federal Government, in  PAMPHLETS  ON  THE  CONSTITUTON  OF  THE  UNITED
STATES  217,  236 (P. Ford. ed.  1888 & republished  1968).
Other misconceptions  included  the view that the Supreme  Court  could review
only federal courtjudgments, supra note  112 (remarks of Rep. Smith), and that article
III's grant of federal judicial power was  exclusive, see supra text accompanying notes
I I 1-13 (remarks of Rep. Smith and Sen. Maclay); see also 3 RECORDS,  supra note  14, at
220  (reprinting  Address  of Luther  Martin  to  the  Maryland  Legislature  (Nov.  29,
1787)).
151  See, e.g.,  ANNALS  OF CONG., supra note  14, at 800-01  (remarks of Rep. Smith);
id. at 813  (remarks of Rep. Burke); id. at 809-10  (remarks  of Rep. Stone).
152  For  a  discussion  of  doubts  about  Congress's  capacity  as  constitutional
interpreter,  see  Brest,  Congress as Constitutional  Decisionmaker and Its Power to  Counter
Judicial Doctrine, 21  GA.  L. REv.  57 (1986).
153  See Clinton, Early Implementation, supra note 6, at 1524-27; Warren, supra note
22,  at 62.
154  See Amar, supra note 6, at  1540; cf  1 W.  CROSSKEY,  supra note  18, at 610-11
(contending that Congress,  in the  First Judiciary Act,  "contrived  to slow down  the
process of change"  contemplated  by the  Constitution's plan for the judiciary).
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Judiciary  Act.' 55  Overall,  however,  his  article  conveys  a  somewhat
different  impression-that  the  degree  of correspondence  between
the  Act  and  his  thesis  is  of critical  importance.  That impression
arises, in part, from the article's focus on the Act.  To this extent, the
impression may be somewhat  misleading, as the article grows out of
a paper  delivered  at  a  conference  devoted  specifically  to  the  First
Judiciary  Act.' 5 6  The  impression  is  also  based,  however,  on what
Amar says:  "Central to my argument about post-ratification  Ameri-
can history was my claim that, beginning with the FirstJudiciary  Act,
congressional  statutes  had  always  reflected  the  basic  principals
underlying the two-tier  thesis, with de  minimis exceptions,"' 1 7  and
"[v]irtually  every major principle  and  premise  underlying the  two-
tier  thesis  was  given  voice-sometimes  resoundingly,  other  times
more faintly, yet nonetheless  distinctly-in  the legislative history of
the First Judiciary Act."'
' 5 8
My impression  also may result simply from our different inter-
pretations  of the Act  and  its history.  Insofar as  Amar's interpreta-
tions strike me as forced rather than forceful, I am  impelled to think
he must believe the degree of correspondence  between the Act and
his thesis is crucial.  I would find Amar's thesis more convincing if he
admitted that significant discontinuities  exist between his thesis and
the Act, but contended instead that when all the plausible arguments
are considered, his position remains  the most attractive one.
That kind of admission does not seem to me to render a decisive
blow to his thesis.  For though his arguments have a  lot of historical
trappings,  history  ultimately  plays,  if not a  subordinate,  then  cer-
tainly not the dominant role in his interpretive methodology.  Amar
describes  his  Neo-Federalist  interpretation  of the  Constitution  as
attempting  "to  offer  a useable past-a set of Federalist doctrines  in
harmony  with  post-Federalist  developments  and  the  realities  of
twentieth-century life and law.' 5 9  He thus offers us structural prin-
ciples  rooted as much in his  understanding of present-day  needs as
in  the  views  of the framing  generation.  One  can  say,  without  the
least bit of criticism, that it is a form of lawyer's history.  It is not the
155  See Amar,  Neo-Federalist  View,  supra note 1,  at 259.
156  Furthermore,  Amar wished  to respond  to  other commentators  who  have
themselves  interpreted  the Act as supporting a rival understanding of article III.  See
Casto, supra note  55; Clinton, Early Implementation, supra note  6.  He also  wished  to
respond to the questions about his thesis  raised in Hart &  Wechsler, see supra note 13
and accompanying  text, some of which referred  to the First Judiciary Act.
157  Amar, supra note 6, at  1515.
158  Id.  at  1565-66.
159  Amar, Sovereignty, supra note  103, at  1427 n.9  (emphasis added).HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE  III
crude law office history of an advocate looking selectively for confir-
mation of his position, but it also is not the effort of an historian to
reconstruct  the  constitutional  and  political  understandings  of the
framing generation for their own sake,  rather than in conscious ser-
vice of a normative argument about constitutional interpretation.
1 60
It is, rather, the use of history and structural argument in a kind of
reflexive  process,  employing  each  to  illuminate  and  reinforce  the
other.161
Given  that  methodology,  it is  not surprising  that Amar, while
stressing the importance  of text, the views  of the framers,  and  the
First Judiciary Act, places great emphasis  on the "underlying struc-
tural vision"  on which his thesis rests. 62  He is not alone in stressing
structural interpretation;  each of the other two theories of article III
that I  have mentioned-the  "essential  functions"  position  and  the
traditionalist position-includes  an important set of structural argu-
ments.1 63  Given  the centrality of Amar's  structural  vision of article
III, I wish to explore  some of that vision's key elements.
160  Some students of interpretation  would claim that Amar is merely conscious
that he is doing what the rest of us do unconsciously-reading  the past through our
own  experiences.  See,  e.g.,  R.  BERNSTEIN,  BEYOND  OBJECTIVISM  AND  RELATIVISM:
SCIENCE,  HERMENEUTICS,  AND  PRAXIs  (1983); see also P. NOVICK,  THAT NOBLE DREAM:
THE  "OBJECTIVITY  QUESTION"  AND  THE  AMERICAN  HISTORICAL  PROFESSION  (1988)
(providing a history of the idea of historical objectivity among American professional
historians).  My own view is that while there exists no objective  Archimedean  point
from  which  to  evaluate  historical  events,  historical  observers  have  a  significant
capacity  to control the extent to which their historical understandings are shaped by
present day  experiences  and concerns, and good historians try very hard to do so.
Indeed, if legal advocates  (who selectively adduce historical evidence to support their
clients' positions) were indistinguishable  from historians  (who, the argument would
go,  selectively  adduce  historical  evidence  to  support  their  ideology  or
preconceptions),  the phrase  "law  office  history"  would  not  resonate with  us  as  it
does.
161  For  a  sensitive  discussion  of  these  and  related  issues,  see  Fallon,  A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional  Interpretation, 100 HIv. L.  REV.  1189
(1987).
162  Amar, supra note 6, at 1566;  see also id. at 1508.
163  Each  also  rests  on  textual  arguments:  Amar's  on  the  words  "all"  and
"shall"; the essential  functions thesis on the phrase "such exceptions..,  as Congress
shall  make,"  with  the  word  "exceptions"  read  as  more  limited  than  a power  to
withhold jurisdiction altogether, see Ratner, Congressional  Power, supra note 65, at 168-
71; and the traditionalist position also on the exceptions clause, which is read instead
as a grant of unlimited power to Congress,  see,  e.g.,  Redish,  Power to Regulate, supra
note  2, at 906-07.
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B.  Structural  Argument and Article III
1.  The Range  of Amar's  Structural Arguments
A  striking feature  of Amar's  thesis  is  the variety  of structural
arguments that he musters.  Their sheer number seems to add great
power to his account.  On inspection, however, there is a kind of mis-
match  between his  thesis arid many of the arguments he musters.
Amar refers  repeatedly to the "coextensiveness  principle":  that
federal  courts must speak authoritatively in  cases arising under fed-
eral  law, whether in  law,  equity, or admiralty. 16 '  But that principle
does  not fit the two  tiers  he describes.  Though Amar  asserts  that
"federal  norms"  are  "virtually  always"  implicated  in  admiralty,16 5
admiralty cases were not viewed  as cases under federal law until the
twentieth century.
1 66  Rather they were seen as constituting  "a sepa-
rate  corpus of law claiming the respect of all maritime nations."
' 6 7
Furthermore, cases affecting ambassadors were probably more likely
to arise under nonfederal  than federal law.
16 '  Thus, the "coexten-
164  Amar, supra note  6, at 151 1-12,  1539,  1557,  1563-65.
165  Id.  at 1513.
166  See, e.g.,  American  Ins. Co.  v. Canter,  26 U.S.  (1 Pet.) 511,  545 (1828)  ("A
case in admiralty  does not, in fact, arise under the constitution or laws of the United
States.").  See generally supra note 84; supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
167  Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal  Law, 54 COLUM.  L. REV.  489, 531
(1954).  The "mandatory"  admiraltyjurisdiction  thus might be viewed as very similar
to the  "non-mandatory"  jurisdiction  over  controversies  between  two  states.  Both
implicate  uniquely  federal  interests,  may require adjudicating  competing  rights  of
different sovereigns,  and are  governed  by a  body of judge-made  law that draws  in
part on the law of nations, see New Jersey v. Delaware,  291 U.S.  361,  378-83  (1934);
see also Connecticut v. Massachusetts,  282 U.S. 660,  670 (1931);  Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S.  46, 98  (1907),  and  that is now viewed as federal common law, see HART  &
WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 318-22, 884; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
Insofar as admiralty cases involved federal statutes, article III's  "arising under"
jurisdiction, limited as it is to cases in "law  and equity,"  might not alone satisfy the
coextensiveness  principle, as an admiralty case may have been understood as a form
of action different from a suit in law or equity, see supra text  accompanying notes 82-
89.  But admiralty  cases involving federal legislation were presumably a small portion
of admiralty actions  generally, and Amar's coextensiveness  principle could have been
satisfied  by  the far more modest  specification of an  "arising  under" jurisdiction  in
cases  in "law,  equity, or admiralty."
168  Amar recognizes  this difficulty, but suggests that it is somehow cured by the
fact  that  the  cases  arise  under  the  Supreme  Court's  original jurisdiction,  which
Congress  has no authority  to limit.  See Amar, supra note 6, at  1513.  The suggestion
is correct, but not really responsive; it does not address the mis-match between  the
coextensiveness  principle and his inclusion of the ambassador jurisdiction within the
mandatory tier.  Indeed,  when he does  discuss the Court's original jurisdiction, he
relies  on the premise that the ambassador  component is mandatory  because it falls
within  the  first  tier.  See  Amar, supra note  6,  at  1524-25.  Hence,  his  argument
ultimately  fails to meet the objection.HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE  OF ARTICLE III
siveness"  principle  cannot  explain  the  two  tiers  as  defined  by
Amar.'
69
A second  structural point  on which  Amar's  thesis  relies  is  the
"principle  of inadequate political safeguards"-that mandatory  fed-
eral court jurisdiction is necessary to protect constitutional rights. 7 °
But  that argument  plainly  calls  for a  far narrower  mandatory  tier,
excluding not only ambassador and admiralty cases, but suits arising
under federal statutes  and treaties. 171
A  third  component  of Amar's  argument  is  the  "principle  of
structural  superiority"-that  article  III judges,  federally  appointed
and constitutionally protected as to tenure and salary, are superior to
state court judges, who are vulnerable to political and parochial pres-
sures.1 72  Here, too,  the premise (even if accepted)  does not clearly
fit the two-tier thesis.  After all, the six party-based jurisdictions were
created  precisely  because  the  cases  within  them  presented  special
risks of state court partiality.  Why, then, is  "structural  superiority"
less important in the non-mandatory  than the mandatory tier?  Or to
put that question more concretely,  is  there less  risk of bias  when a
state court adjudicates  a  suit brought by the forum  state against  a
non-citizen,  or an action involving rival land grants from the forum
state and its neighbor, than when the state court adjudicates  a fed-
eral  question  action  between  a  patent-holder  and  an  alleged
infringer?
Amar's response is that the party-based jurisdictions were made
non-mandatory because of the risk of local  parochialism  was expected
to  erode  over  time  -- a familiar,  though  hardly  uncontroversial,
element  of modem  debate  about diversity jurisdiction. 17 4  By  con-
trast, the risk of state court political dependence when  deciding issues
within the mandatory tier was ineradicable.  Stated this way, the prin-
ciple of structural  superiority  partially  fits  his thesis-to  the  same
extent as  the coextensiveness  principle.
But  two points  about his  argument  are worth noting.  First, I
169  Amar  acknowledges  that  many  of the  comments  he  cites  as  evidence
supporting  the  coextensiveness  principle  pertain  only  to  federal  question
jurisdiction.  See Amar, supra note 6, at 1565.
170  See id. at 1512-13,  1564;  Amar, Neo-Federalist  View, supra note 1,  at  220-24.
171  See Redish,  Constitutional  Limitations, supra note 5, at  152; see also supra text
accompanying  note 5 (criticizing a related argument  by Lawrence  Sager).
172  See Amar, supra note 6, at 1509-10,  1559-63.
173  Amar, Neo-Federalist View,  supra note 1,  at 246.
174  Compare H.  FRIENDLY,  FEDERAL  JURISDIaION:  A  GENERAL  VIEW  147-48
(1972)  with Shapiro, Federal  DiversityJurisdiction:  A  Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARv. L.
REv.  317, 329-32  (1977).
1990] 16151616  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  138:1569
think it is not unfair to describe his definition of the principle as com-
ing rather  close  to  incorporating  the very  two-tier  thesis  in whose
support  it is offered.  Second, the evidence  that the framers  distin-
guished between these two potential vices of state courts, and viewed
parochialism  as more  transitory,  is uncertain  at best.  75  To me,  it
seems  improbable,  for  example,  that  the  framers  would  have
expected that over time, a Massachusetts court could be trusted fairly
to uphold a land grant from Connecticut in preference to one from
Massachusetts, but not to uphold a federal patent.  It seems similarly
doubtful that the framers would have expected that after some years
had passed, if Massachusetts  sued Connecticut in Massachusetts state
court,  the problem  of "home  court advantage"  would  have  disap-
peared.  Thus it is far from clear that the structural superiority prin-
ciple offers much support for the two-tier thesis.
176
175  Amar does  provide support  for  the  view  that  in the  ratification  debates,
diversity jurisdiction  was  viewed by some important  federalists as non-essential,  see,
e.g.,  Amar,  Neo-Federalist View,  supra note  1, at  245  n.130,  though their statements
may have been strategically motivai:ed.  In any event, the more precise claim noted in
the text-that the framers anticipated the decline of parochialism favoring the forum
state, or its citizens against outsiders, but not of parochialism favoring state law over
federal law-seems to lack support.  Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 30, at 510
(in discussing federal  question jurisdiction, noting that "the most discerning cannot
foresee how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the' local
tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes  ..  "); supra text accompanying notes
39-41.
In the present  piece, Amar cited excerpts  from the notes for the speech in the
first Congress by William Paterson.  See Amar, supra note 6, at 1555.  A fuller citation
of those notes is as follows:
Become one People.  We must have Tribunals of our own pervading every
State, operating upon every Object of a national kind.  Hence Uniformity
of Decision-Hence we shall approximate to each other gradually-Hence
we shall be assimilated in Manner, in  Laws, in Customs-Local Prejudices
will  be removed-State  Passions  & Views will  be done  away-the  Mind
expands-it will embrace  the Union; we shall think and feel,  & act as one
People-
Casto, supra note 55, at  1130-31.  Here, too, the discussion of prejudice, prefaced as
it is  by discussion  of uniformity  of decision,  appears  to  relate at  least  as much  to
federal question jurisdiction (or more generally, to the existence of uniform national
regulation) as to party-based jurisdictions.
176  As Amar recognizes, that principle also fits uneasily with the limitation of the
Supreme  Court's jurisdiction  to  review  state  court judgments  via  certiorari.  The
development of certiorari does not undercut the force of  Amar's historical argument,
for at  its  inception  the  Supreme  Court had  the  capacity  to review  all  state court
decisions, and there is no reason to believe that the framers anticipated the dramatic
increases  in  its workload.  See Amar, Neo-Federalist View,  supra note  1, at  267.  But
insofar  as  Amar  presents  the  structural  superiority  principle  as  a  guide  to
constitutional interpretation today,  there is a real problem squaring his thesis with aHISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE III
2.  The Parity of Supreme and Inferior Federal  Courts
Amar  relies  heavily  on  still  another  structural  argument,  one
that he  deems  the  "most  important"  of all. 17 7  For  him,  a  crucial
structural feature  of  article III's  design  is that Supreme  Court and
lower  federal  court judges  are  in  constitutional  parity  with  each
other.  Thus,  article III  is indifferent  whether mandatory  tier  cases
are heard  by the Supreme Court on appeal or by the lower federal
courts in the first instance.1 78  His claim of parity within the federal
judiciary permits  him  to resist the contention that  the Constitution
requires  creation of a federal  court system that can ensure uniform
interpretation  of federal  law.1 7'  For  that  argument,  if accepted,
points  toward  limits  on  Congress's  power  to restrict  the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction  in  particular,  rather  than  that  of the  federal
courts as a whole.
I find Amar's  suggestion of parity between  the Supreme Court
and lower  federal  courts  unpersuasive.  Article III,  after  all, itself
prescribes  a  single  Supreme  Court  not subject  to  further  review,
while leaving creation  of the lower  federal courts  to  congressional
choice.' 80  The specification  of the  Supreme Court's original juris-
system in which,  as a practical matter, nearly all state court suits that "arise under"
federal law for the purposes of article III are unreviewable.
Though  Amar thinks  that  this development  is  in  tension with  the  "spirit"  of
article III, he does not view the denial  to a state court litigant of a right to Supreme
Court review as an actual constitutional violation, because  Congress has not limited
the Supreme Court's power to review any particular state court judgment.  See id. at
267-69.  But if, as Amar asserts, the  framers  thought that "dramatic  differences  in
selection,  tenure,  and  removal  procedures  between  state  and  federal  benches
translate into predictable long-run  differences in decisional outcomes,"  Amar, supra
note  6,  at  1509,  and  that  the  likely  state  court  outcomes  were  constitutionally
intolerable unless some article III court had the final  word, see id. at 1510,  then it is
hard to see why certiorari is not unconstitutional in fact as well as in spirit.  See supra
note  13.  As  he points  out, providing  federal  review  in  every  case  is  not  in fact
impracticable:  Congress could restrict the scope of federal jurisdiction in the "non-
mandatory"  categories,  authorize  the  lower  federal  courts  to  review  state  court
decisions,  and prescribe that the Supreme Court  (like the courts of appeals)  should
ordinarily hear cases in panels of three, reserving en banc review for cases of special
importance.
177  Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note  1, at 221; see also Amar, supra note 6, at
1510.
178  See Amar, Neo-Federalist View, supra note  1, at  221-22,  254-58;  Amar, supra
note 6, at  1510.
179  See Clinton, Early Implementation, supra note 6, at 1518 n.5.
180  Amar notes these  points and  states  that he does  not "deny  the Supreme
Court's  unique constitutional  position,"  Amar, Original  Jurisdiction,  supra note  1, at
466  n.107,  but at the  same  time  he does not ascribe much  significance  to  it.  He
argues,  for  example,  that  the  First Judiciary  Act's  provision  that  Supreme Court
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diction also suggests  (particularly if I am right in discounting Amar's
geographical explanation)  that there is something unique about that
tribunal.  Moreover,  at  the  Convention,  in  the ratification  debates,
and in the first Congress, there surely was  a widespread expectation
that the Supreme Court would exercise  appellate jurisdiction, often
coupled with the observation that only such review could ensure uni-
formity.18'  That expectation  may explain  why  Madison  stated  that
"[t]he  most  material part [of article III's  organization  of the judici-
ary] is  the discrimination of superior and inferior jurisdiction."'
1 8 2
It may well be, as the tiraditionalists argue, that insisting that the
Justices sit with district judges  on the circuit courts supports his claim of parity. See
Amar, supra note 6,  at  1537.  However,  whatever questions  circuit riding may  have
raised under the appointments  clause, see Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:
The Powers of  the Federal  Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U.  CHI. L. REV. 646, 663-64 (1982),  the
circuit and Supreme Courts were rather clearly distinguishable on the bases noted in
the text.
181  See, e.g.,  ANNALS  OF  CONG., supra note 14,  at 829 (remarks of Rep.  Smith); it
at  848  (remarks  of Rep.  Sherman);  3  ELLIOT'S  DEBATES,  supra note  5,  at  518-19
(remarks  of Edmund Pendleton);  4 id. at  147  (remarks ofJames Iredell);  EssAYs  ON
THE CONsTrrurIoN, supra note 91,  at 155,  159 (reprinting Letter to Landholders and
Farmers from  a Landholder  (V),  Conn.  Courant, Dec. 3,  1787 (attributed to Oliver
Ellsworth));  THE  FEDERALIST  Nos.  22,  80,  82, supra note  30,  at  197,  500,  516-17;
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 2,  at 11;  1 RECORDS, supra note  14, at  124 (remarks of
John  Rutledge);  Casto, supra note  55,  at  1129-30,  1135,  1138  (reprinting notes  of
Senator Paterson); see also Cohens  v. Virginia,  19 U.S.  (6 Wheat.) 264, 416-18  (1821);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,  14 U.S.  (1 Wheat) 304, 347-48  (1816).
There is a different respect in which the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
are not  interchangeable,  a  point noted  by  both Madison  and  Hamilton.  Madison
concluded
that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed throughout the Republic with
final jurisdiction  in  many  cases,  appeals  would  be multiplied  to  a  most
oppressive  degree;  that besides, an appeal would not in many cases  be a
remedy.  What was  to be done after improper Verdicts  in State  tribunals
obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent Judge, or the local
prejudices  of an undirected jury?
1 RECORDS, supra note  14,  at  124.  Hamilton echoed  this point:
The right of appeal  is by no means equal to the right of applying, in the
first instance,  to a Tribunal  agreeable  to the suitor.  The desideratum is to
have impartial justice, at a moderate expence, administered 'promptly and
without delay;'  not to be obliged to seek it through  the long and tedious
and expensive process of an appeal.  It  is true, that in causes of sufficient
magnitude, an appeal ought to be open;  which includes the possibility of
going through that process: but when  the Courts of original jurisdiction
are  so  constituted  as  not  only  to  deserve  but  to  inspire  confidence,
appeals, from the inevitable  inconvenience  attached to  them, are  excep-
tions to the general rule of redress  ....
4  THE  FOUNDER'S  CONsTrrtrioN  166-67  (P.  Kurland  &  M.  Lerner  eds.  1987)
(reprinting Hamilton,  The Examination, No.  6  (Jan. 2,  1802)).
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Supreme  Court  have  power  to  create  uniformity  (or  to  enforce
supremacy)  confuses familiar and  desirable arrangements  with con-
stitutionally required  ones.183  Or it may be, as Leonard Ratner has
argued, that  creation of both uniformity  and supremacy  should be
viewed as constitutionally required." 8 4  Is there, however, a coherent
basis for concluding,  as Amar does,  that article III does protect the
supremacy of federal law  (vis-a-vis the states and the federal political
branches), but does  not require uniformity?
One possible answer, given by Amar in his reply, is that the First
Judiciary Act, by limiting the Supreme  Court jurisdiction to  review
lower  federal  courts  decisions,  clearly  contemplated  non-uniform-
ity.1 8 5  But if the First Judiciary Act is decisive evidence that uniform-
ity is  not required,  then  it presumably  is  equally  decisive evidence
(unless  Amar's  discussion  of section  25  is  found  persuasive)  that
even  the  federal  question jurisdiction  is  not  mandatory.  Is  there
some other basis, then, for reading article III as mandatory  (in first
tier cases),  but wholly indifferent to the uniformity of federal  law?
C.  "The  Holistic Principle"
For Amar, a possible  answer  is provided  by what he  calls  "the
holistic principle,"  for a key element of his interpretation is that arti-
cle III should be viewed as a whole.' 86  This suggestion is appealing,
particularly when contrasted with his characterization  of the alterna-
tive  as  "selective  literalism's  divide-and-conquer  (il)logic"' 8 7  For
me, a good part of his argument's ingenuity and attractiveness comes
from his effort to link three different aspects of article III:  the tenure
and salary  protection,  the exceptions  clause,  and  the discretion  of
Congress  in creating lower federal courts.  If his  theory in fact pro-
vides a coherent account of these various elements  of article III, is it
not the most satisfying structural interpretation  of that provision?
To answer that question, we need briefly to review  the framing
of the judiciary article  at the  Convention.  There was  little dissent
from the suggestion that federal judges should enjoy tenure and sal-
183  See, e.g.,  Gunther, supra note 2,  at 908.
184  See Ratner, Congressional  Power, supra note  65.
185  See Amar, Reply, supra note  9, at  1670.
186  See Amar, supra note 6, at 1506-07.
187  See id. at  1506-07.  Robert Clinton is similarly  pejorative  about arguments
that,  in  his  view,  take  separate  clauses  of  article  III  "out  of context"  and  "in
isolation."  Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 4, at 797 n.177.
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ary protection,' 88 or that the Constitution should call for a Supreme
Court.' 89  Far greater disagreement  surfaced  about the desirability
of creating lower federal  courts.  The Committee of the Whole, hav-
ing initially  approved  the mandatory  establishment  of inferior fed-
eral courts,  subsequently voted to eliminate them entirely. Later the
same  day,  the  Committee  approved  a  compromise,  moved  by
Madison and  Wilson, to  permit but not require Congress  to  create
inferior  federal  courts.' 90  Opposition  to  that  compromise  resur-
faced when the Committee's report came before the Convention, but
in  the  end  the  "Madisonian  Compromise"  was  unanimously
approved.'91
Amar's  theory is entirely consistent with congressional preroga-
tive to  create  lower federal  courts.  It is  consistent,  too, with  Con-
gress's  having  broad  power  under  the  exceptions  clause  to  limit
Supreme Court jurisdiction.  But echoing Robert Clinton, he charac-
terizes  the exceptions  clause as  "empowering  Congress  to shift the
last word on any  case in the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
to lower federal courts."' 9 2  Under that interpretation, an article III
judge, loyal to  national interests and protected from political  inter-
ference, would resolve all mandatory  tier cases.
As  elegant  and  alluring  as  this  argument  is,  Amar's  account
could be seen as a somewhat  unlikely interpretation  of the Conven-
tion's proceedings.  The exceptions  clause was drafted in the Com-
mittee  of  Detail,'93  only  after  the  Convention  had  forged  a
compromise on lower federal courts.  As Lawrence Sager notes, that
clause "was  adopted by the Convention on August 27 without a rip-
188  The principal dispute involving this provision was whether increases as  well
as decreases in salary should be prohibited. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 2, at 6.
189  There  was  clearly  an  expectation  that  state  court  decisions  would  be
reviewable by the Supreme  Court.  See sources cited supra note  181.
190  The history  and supporting  citations are  set  forth in  HART  & WECHSLER,
supra note 2,  at  10-11.
191  See 2  RECORDS,  supra note  14, at 45-46.
192  Amar, supra note 6, at  15110; see also Clinton, A Guided Quest, supra note 4, at
753-54.
193  See  2  RECORDS,  supra note  14,  at  38-39,  45-46,  186-87.  The  Committee
appears  to have taken the language  from a draft in James Wilson's handwriting.  See
id. at  173.
A  plan of Hamilton's,  apparently  never presented as  such to  the  Convention,
provided for appellate jurisdiction  in certain cases, "subject to such exceptions as are
herein  contained  and  to such  regulations  as the Legislature  shall provide."  3 id  at
626.  The plan may have been the basis for his speech ofJune  18,  but the surviving
records of that speech include no reference to the "exceptions"  language.  See 1 id  at
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ple  of recorded  debate,  concern,  or  explication." ' 194  On  Amar's
account, the Committee of Detail added, the Convention approved,
and-the  states ratified, a power  to limit Supreme Court jurisdiction
that, insofar  as  actually  exercised  in  mandatory  tier  cases,  would
effectively undo the Madisonian compromise and require vesting of
lower  federal  court jurisdiction.  In  one  respect,  the  exceptions
clause assumes less significance in Amar's view than in the traditional
view,  because  Congress  cannot  simply  eliminate  Supreme  Court
jurisdiction, but must transfer it to the lower federal  courts.195  But
in another sense, the clause assumes more significance under Amar's
reading, for the creation of exceptions would result in the imposition
on Congress of the very obligation to create lower federal courts that
the Convention had so clearly  rejected. 196
Though one hesitates  to argue, given  the state of the historical
records, that surely someone would have commented on such a cen-
tral change, the question cannot be entirely dismissed.197  Put differ-
ently, it is far from clear that the delegates in Philadelphia and in the
various state ratifying conventions viewed  tenure and salary protec-
tion, congressional prerogative in creating lower federal courts, and
the exceptions  clause  as in fact interconnected.
If Amar's  theory is, from one angle too holistic, it may be not
holistic  enough  from another.  Amar's  argument  focuses  primarily
on various  clauses of article III.  Some traditional  theorists, by con-
trast, would emphasize the relationship of congressional control over
jurisdiction to the institution ofjudicial review itself-particularly  to
the  scope  and  indeterminacy  of the  Constitution,  and  the  corre-
spondingly great power that courts necessarily  exercise when called
upon to enforce  it.  Charles  Black,  the dean of structural  constitu-
tional interpretation, has argued that congressional power to control
federal courtjurisdiction  "is  the rock on which rests the legitimacy of
the judicial work in a democracy."
198
194  Sager,  supra  note  3,  at  51.  The clause  was  referred  to  frequently  in  the
ratification debates, but in the specific context of limiting the Supreme Court's power
to review issues of fact resolved byjuries.  See, e.g.,  Clinton, A  Guided Quest, supra note
4, at 803-10.
195  See Amar, Reply, supra note  9, at  1658.
196  Cf  id at 1654 (criticizing Martin Redish as reading the exceptions  clause as
"an  implied repeal of unambiguous  prior commands").
197  Cf  Sager,  supra note 3,  at  51  ("In light  of this  quiescence,  it  is  hard  to
imagine that the framers were consciously adopting a provision that could completely
unravel one of the most basic aspects of the constitutional scheme to which they had
committed  themselves  [the Supreme  Court's  superintendence  of state  compliance
with the Constitution].").
198  Black, The Presi~dncy and Congress, 32 WASH.  & LEE L. REv. 841, 846 (1975); see
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Admittedly,  one  could  acknowledge  these  features  of judicial
review  without  necessarily  agreeing  with  Black's  position.  One's
conclusion  probably depends,  I  think, on how  one approaches  the
inescapable  tension  between  judicial  independence  and  political
accountability, 199 or, put differently, whether one views greater judi-
cial  freedom  from  congressional  control  as  making judges  autono-
mously  political  rather  than  apolitical.20 °  An  appeal  to  holism
cannot resolve that question.
I have  a final, and more general,  question about Amar's appeal
to "the  holistic principle."  All first-year law students learn the criti-
cal importance in legal argument of the generality with which a prop-
osition is  framed.  Last year, for  example, Justice Scalia  suggested
that, in relying upon historical tradition as  a guide to  constitutional
argument, "[w]e  refer to  the most specific  level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can
be  identified." 20'  Predic:ably,  a  number  of  his  colleagues  dis-
agreed.202  At the other end of the spectrum, one might take a holis-
tic  approach  to  the  Bill  of Rights,  and  seek  a  general  theory  of
also M.  PERRY,  THE CONSTITUTION,  THE COURTS,  AND  HUMAN RIGrrs  125-35  (1982)
(Congress  may restrict jurisdiction  to engage  in "noninterpretive"  judicial review);
Wechsler,  supra note  33,  at  1048.  More  tentatively,  Hart &  Wechsler  raises  the
question  whether it  is  "perhaps  politically  healthy that  the limits  of congressional
power  over  Supreme  Court  appellate  jurisdiction  have  never  bcn  completely
clarified."  HART  & WECHSLER,  supra note 2,  at 381.
'99  See,  e.g.,  Seidman, Ambivalence  and Accountability,  61  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  1571
(1988).  This tension was recognized in the founding era. See, e.g.,  2 H. STORING, supra
note  19,  at 439-42  (reprinting Essay of Brutus  (Mar. 29,  1788)).
The  relationship  between  those  views  and  conclusions  about  congressional
control  over jurisdiction  is not,  however,  simple  or predictable.  For example,  the
view  that  article  III  does  not  limit  Congress's  power  to  restrict  federal  court
jurisdiction  is  shared  (i) in  part  by  Michael  Perry,  an  advocate  of broad  non-
interpretive  review, see M. PERRY, supra note  198,  at  128-45;  (ii) by Charles Black, a
'judicial  activist proudly self-confessed,"  see C. BLACK,  STRUCTURE AND  RELATIONSHIP
IN CONSTrrUTIONAL  LAw 72 (1969); supra note 198 and accompanying text; and (iii) by
scholars  far  more  skeptical  about judicial  activism,  see,  e.g.,  Bator,  supra note  2;
Gunther, supra  note 2; Wechsler, supra note  2.
200  Compare R.  POSNER,  THE  FEDERAL  COURTS  16  (1985)  (expressing  the  first
view) with Amar, Neo-Federalist  View, supra note  1,  at 230 (expressing the second view).
201  Michael H. v. Gerald  D.,  109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(finding that putative biological father of child whose mother was married to another
man when child was  born has no liberty interest in relationship  with the child).
202  See id. at 2346-47  (O'Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring in part);
id. at  2347  (Stevens, J.,  concurring  in  the judgment);  id. at  2349-51  (Brennan, J.,
joined  by Marshall and  Blackmun, JJ.,  dissenting).HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE  III
constitutional protection of individual liberty, perhaps akin to Justice
Brandeis's "right to be let alone.
2 0 3
My point is not that eitherJustice Scalia orJustice Brandeis was
right, or that argument  about the appropriate  level  of generality  is
necessarily hopeless  or arbitrary.  It is, rather, that holism is not an
obviously  desirable  interpretive  canon,  precisely  because  it pushes
toward  a  greater  level  of  generality  in  constitutional  inter-
pretation.
20
4
V.  FEDERAL JURISDICTION  AND  THE  DuAL CONCEPTS  OF PARrrY
Though I have expressed a number of doubts about Amar's the-
sis,  they should not conceal  my keen admiration  for its originality,
ingenuity  and power.  In  comparing  it  to  rival  accounts,  I  have  at
times felt a bit like the rabbi who, the story goes, was asked to resolve
a dispute.  After hearing one side's account of the matter, the rabbi
declared,  "You're  right."  After  the  second  disputant  gave  his
account,  the  rabbi  told  him,  "You're  right."  When  a  bystander
objected,  "Rabbi,  they  can't both be  right,"  the  rabbi responded,
"You're right."
Amar insists, however, that it is important to  take a stand, and
one who rejects his theory must endorse a competing one and argue
for its superiority.20 5  His reply goes further, contending that I have
failed to (1) "set out the (hi)story as [he] set it out, and show why [he
is]  wrong, "206  (2)  present  an  "integrated  counternarrative  of the
'traditional'  position,"20 7 and  (3)  take on Robert Clinton's  broader
mandatory thesis.20  I plead guilty to the gist of the charge.  I do not
present the same historical narrative  as he does, one viewed through
the lens  of his  thesis and its  supporting "principles,"  for  I do  not
203  Olmstead  v.  United  States,  277  U.S.  438,  478  (1928)  (Brandeis,  J.,
dissenting).
204  See generally Blasi, Creativity and Legitimacy in Constitutional  Law (Book Review),
80 YALE  L.J.  176,  183 (1970)  (discussing the indeterminacy  of structural approaches
to  constitutional  interpretation).  As  Charles  Black's  interpretation  of  article  III
demonstrates,  a  more  holistic  approach  does  not  necessarily  result  in  expanded
constitutional limits.  But in  individual rights cases, where  Le  problem is a familiar
one,  a  holistic  approach  is  likely  to  lead  to  more  expansive  interpretation  of
constitutional protections.  See Brest,  The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential
Contradictions  of Normative Constitutional  Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ.  1063,  1084-85  (1981).
205  See Amar, Reply, supra note  9, at 1662.
206  Id.
207  Id. at  1671.
208  See  id.  at  1657.  For  brief  discussion  of  Clinton's  views,  see  supra text
accompanying notes 4-8.
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interpret the text and history just as he does.  Nor have I been able,
in this discussion of Amar's account, to cover as much terrain as he
and Clinton have covered in five articles and well over four hundred
pages. 20 9  But I hope that from what I have written, the reasons  are
clear why I find Amar's  thesis, though very powerful, not quite per-
suasive. (Some of my reasons have been presented by others, though
these  articles,  written  before  Amar's,  do  not discuss  his  thesis.)21 1
Amar's reply tries to demonstrate  the comparative  superiority of his
view.  In doing so,  he emphasizes  some points but not others.  The
reader  has  plenty  of  raw  material  to  consider  in  reaching  an
independent judgment.
Here,  I  wish  to  address  a  different  question:  why  does  Amar
insist  that it is  important  to resolve  which  theory  is most  satisfac-
tory-and  more generally,  what  is  at  stake  in  the  debate  over  the
scope of congressional power to regulate federal  court jurisdiction?
The volume of commentary about congressional control of fed-
eral  court jurisdiction is in some respects curious.  Recent  congres-
sional  efforts  to  restrict  federal  court jurisdiction  have  not  even
passed both Houses, much less avoided presidential veto.  Moreover,
apart from the gaps already noted, it is not clear that Congress  has
ever  passed  a statute  that Amar would  find  unconstitutional.2 1 1  A
variety of practical,  political, and structural  forces suggest  that this
209  See Amar, OriginalJurisdtion,  supra note  1; Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra
note  1;  Amar, supra note  6;  Clinton,  A  Guided Quest, supra note  4;  Clinton, Early
Implementation, supra note 6.
210  See,  e.g.,  Bator, supra note  2,  at  1041;  Gunther, supra note  2,  at  908-10;
Wechsler, supra note 2, at  1001.
211  The Norris LaGuardia  Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932)  (codified at 29 U.S.C.  §§  101-
15 (1982)),  forbids the federal courts  to issue injunctions in labor disputes  (except in
narrowly  specified  circumstances)  or to  enforce  "yellow  dog"  contracts.  The Act
would  violate Amar's  understanding  of article III  only.insofar  as  (i) a party had  a
constitutional right to an injunctive remedy in a labor dispute, or to enforcement of a
"yellow-dog"  contract,  and  (ii)  the  Act  bars  the Supreme  Court  from  reviewing  a
state  court  decision  denying  injunctive  relief  or  enforcement  of  a  contract  (as
distinguished from the Court's issuing the relief itself).  On the second point, the Act
forbids  any  court of the  United States,  defined  to include the Supreme  Court,  "to
issue"  an injunction, and provides  that no yellow dog contract shall be "enforceable
in any court of the United States."  Id.  §§  103-07,  113(d).
The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, precluded any court, state
or federal, from issuing interlocutory relief, while the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C.  §§  251-62 (1982),  barred any court from hearing certain claims.  Only if these
last two Acts barred constitutionally-required  relief would they be unconstitutional-
for Amar because they foreclosed article III review, for others because "a court must
always be available to pass on claims of constitutional right to judicial process, and to
provide  such process if the claim  is sustained."  Hart, supra note 2,  at  1372.HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE  III
lack of success  is anything but coincidental.212  Authoritative rejec-
tion of Amar's thesis would not, I suspect, increase the likelihood  of
"jurisdiction stripping."
Nor would acceptance of his thesis have important concrete con-
sequences.  Current jurisdictional arrangements  fail  to vest federal
judicial  power  in his  mandatory  tier  only  in  some  aspects  of the
ambassador and arguably the admiralty jurisdictions,213  and I do not
read Amar's  writings  as manifestos  for slight expansions  of federal
court jurisdiction in these areas.
Still, Amar asserts that it matters a good deal whether his thesis
is  accepted.  He quite properly  notes  that the question  of congres-
sional power to control jurisdiction goes  to the heart of the role of
the federal  courts, and adds that one never knows  when a genuine
threat of  jurisdiction-stripping  might emerge.  But more than once,
he stresses  an  additional point:  for him,  the debate  over congres-
sional power to control federal court jurisdiction relates to a general
question about the "parity"  between state and federal  courts:
First,  the  Court  has  often  indulged  in  rhetoric  propagating  the
myth of parity, even as the Court has  at other times spoken more
accurately on the subject. Second, the Court has proliferated a con-
fusing assortment of various abstention doctrines, and dramatically
expanded the scope of many of the individual  categories of absten-
tion.  Not only do many of these decisions  smack of ad hocery, and
disregard the spirit as well  as the  letter of congressional  statutes
allocating various  cases to federal courts, these decisions also turn
the  principles  of article  III  and  the  First Judiciary  Act  on  their
heads  ....  214
I agree with some (though only some) points in this indictment:
212  See,  e.g.,  Tushnet  & Jaff,  Why  the  Debate Over Congress' Power to  Restrict the
Jurisdiction of the  Federal Courts Is  Unending,  72  GEo.  LJ.  1311,  1325-27  (1984);
Wechsler, supra note 2,  at 1006-07.
213  See  supra text accompanying  notes  55-103.  But  cf. supra note  59  (noting
arguable gaps  in arising under jurisdiction).
It is also possible that endorsement of his view might call for reconsideration of
the  constitutionality  of  the  discretionary  certiorari jurisdiction  in reviewing  state
court judgments.  See supra note  176.
214  Amar, supra note  6,  at  1535  (footnotes  omitted);  see  also id. at  1500-01;
Clinton, A  Guided Quest, supra note 4, at 814 n.233 (drawing on his understanding of
article III  in  criticizing  the  Supreme  Court's  administration  of the  federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction  in Stone  v.  Powell,  428  U.S.  465,  493-94  & n.35  (1976),  and
particularly  the  Court's  assumption  that  state  courts  are  as  competent  as  federal
courts  in deciding fourth amendment  issues).
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the  Court's  rhetoric  is  surely  inconsistent,21 5  its  abstention  cases
confusing and often unpersuasive. 2  6  For me, though, the important
215  See  Fallon,  The  Ideologies of Federal Courts,  74  VA.  L.  REV.  1141,  1142-43
(1988).
216  Whatever the merits of particular decisions,  I do not agree that judge-made
abstention  doctrines  disregard  the  spirit  and  letter  of  congressional  grants  of
jurisdiction.  See generally Bator, supra note  66,  at  622 & n.49  (jurisdictional  grants
must be read against "the background  of a large body of standing law in matters of
substance, remedy and jurisdiction");  Shapiro,Jurisdiction  and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U.  L.
REV. 543, 543 (1985).  But see Redish, Abstention, Separation of  Powers, and the Limits of  the
Judicial  Function, 94 YALE  LJ. 71,  72  (1984)  (claiming that abstention  in some cases
prohibits  "the  federal courts  from  enforcing federal civil  rights laws").
In this respect, Arnar also takes issue with Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 415-16 (1923),  which held that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction  over
state  court judgments  impliedly  precludes  exercise  of the  district  courts'  federal
question jurisdiction  to declare a state court decision void.  Amarjustly criticizes the
description of Rooker, in the preface to Hart  &  Wechsler, as a "classic."  See Amar, supra
note  6, at  1535-36  (quoting HART  & WECHSLER, supra note 2, at xxi).  Even since its
recent emergence  from obscurity, see,  e.g.,  District of Columbia Court of Appeals  v.
Feldman,  460  U.S.  462, 476  (19.83),  Rooker  might  not  even  satisfy  Mark  Twain's
definition  of a classic  as  a  work "which  people  praise and  don't  read,"  M.  TWAIN,
FOLLOWING  THE  EQUATOR:  A JOURNEY  AROUND  THE  WORLD  241  (1897),  for Rooker
may just  be  wrong.  The  ordinary  doctrine  limiting  collateral  attack  on  a  final
adjudication  is res judicata, and it is doubtful that "statutes  providing for appellate
review should be read as generating  an independent  set of rules to the same end."
HART  & WECHSLER, supra note 2,  at  1632-34.
Amar objects for a different reason to Rooker, which he reads as suggesting that
federal  district courts  may exercise  original  but not appellate jurisdiction  over state
courts.  But  Rooker  holds  only  that  the  congressional  grant  of  federal  question
jurisdiction  did not permit district courts to entertain collateral  attacks on state court
judgments,  not that Congress  could  not have  granted  such power.  See Rooker, 263
U.S. at 415-16.
Some  of the  broader  language  in  Rooker  can  (though  need  not)  be  read  as
suggesting  that  all  grants  of  district  court  jurisdiction,  not  merely  the  federal
question jurisdiction, preclude the district courts from hearing appeals from the state
courts.  See id. at 416. Amar complains that such a suggestion is in tension with other
statutes that do provide for "appellate jurisdiction,"  "both  de jure (civil rights and
federal  officer removal)  and  de facto  (habeas corpus,  certification,  and  the England
reservation to Pullman abstention)."  Amar, supra note 6, at 1536 (footnotes omitted).
But neither  certification  nor Pullman abstention involves  an appeal  from  the state
courts; suit is filed in federal court first, and the federal court chooses to defer to (and
ordinarily  does not then review)  the state court's determination of an issue of state
law.  Habeas  corpus jurisdiction,  though  in substance  having many  similarities  to
appellate  review, technically  involves  a separate civil lawsuit  (rather than an appeal
from the state court's criminal  case),  in which additional evidence can be taken, and
the  scope of review of state  court determinations,  both of law and  fact, has varied
considerably  from that typically provided on appeal.  Finally, whether or not Justice
Story's view of removal jurisdiction as appellate is deemed persuasive  today, it seems
easy  enough to distinguish  removal  soon after a state court action is filed  from the
effort, in Rooker, to have a federal district court set aside a plenary adjudication by the
state court system.  Rooker may be wrong, but not because it is indistinguishable from
the examples Amar  gives.HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE III
question  this  quotation  raises  is  whether  there  is,  or should  be,  a
strong connection between  two distinct issues,  both of which impli-
cate a question of parity between state and federal courts.  The first
is  the  constitutional  question  whether  article  III  gives  Congress
unlimited  power  to restrict  federal  court jurisdiction,  and to  leave
some  cases  within  the  federal  judicial  power  (or  within  its
"mandatory  tier") to state court resolution.  The second is the sub-
constitutional question whether particular jurisdictional  statutes  (for
example,  habeas  corpus  legislation,217  or  section  1983  and  its
accompanying jurisdictional grant"') should be interpreted as call-
ing for federal court adjudication in particular  circumstances.
Amar's  view  that  the  questions  are  linked  could  be  seen  as
another example of  his preference for holistic explanation.  Here, his
approach  extends  beyond the interpretation  of article III  itself;  he
offers a holistic view of the field of federal jurisdiction-of constitu-
tional and non-constitutional issues-premised  on a single vision of
disparity between state and federal courts.  He described the "aim of
[his initial article on article III as  establishing] as a matter of consti-
tutional law what Burt Neuborne has already argued persuasively  as
a matter of sociology: state judges do not enjoy parity with Article III
judges., 219  My own view is that, whatever the merits of the two-tier
thesis,  this broader  holism is  not particularly  illuminating, and that
discussions  of federal jurisdiction should make more of an effort to
separate the two questions of parity.
220
The  sub-constitutional  doctrines  that  Amar  criticizes-those
restricting federal  habeas  corpus jurisdiction, or providing for fed-
eral court abstention-raise no constitutional question, for Supreme
Court review  of state  court decisions  is  maintained.  Indeed,  Con-
gress  could, consistently  with Amar's  own  thesis,  eliminate federal
habeas  corpus jurisdiction  over  state  convicts.22  Similarly,  Con-
gress, or the courts, could expand further the circumstances in which
federal  courts  abstain  in  favor  of state  court  adjudication.  Thus,
Amar's thesis has no bearing on whether the Supreme Court has cut-
back too  far on federal  habeas  corpus jurisdiction,222  or whether
217  See 28 U.S.C.  §§ 2241-55  (1982).
218  See 42 U.S.C.  § 1983  (1982);  28 U.S.C.  §  1343(a)(3)  (1982).
219  Amar, Neo-Federalist View,  supra note  1, at 238 n.1 15  (citing Neuborne,  The
Myth of Parity, 90  HAzv.  L. REv.  1105  (1977)).
220  1 have not always  been sufficiently careful in this respect.  See Meltzer, State
Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99  HAzv. L. Rav.  1128,  1231-34  (1986).
221  See  HART & WECHSLER,  supra note 2,  at  1577-78.
222  See generally id  at 1506-68; id.  at 124-48  (Supp.  1989).
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Younger  v.  Harris 2 2 3  was  correctly  decided  or  has  been  properly
extended.
Of course,  as  Dick  Fallon  has  argued,224  there  may  well  be  a
connection  between  the  ways  that  particular  scholars  or judges
answer  the  distinct constitutional  and  sub-constitutional  questions
about the parity of state and federal  courts.  Those who believe that
article III limits  Congress's  power to  restrict federal  court jurisdic-
tion  are  more  likely  to  advocate  broad  interpretation  of  habeas
corpus jurisdiction or 42 U.S.C.  §  1983  while disfavoring abstention
doctrines;  those  who  believe  Congress  has  unlimited jurisdictional
power to restrict jurisdiction may be more likely to approve of limita-
tions on the federal  courts' exercise  of statutory jurisdiction.  Thus,
one might believe that acceptance of Amar's thesis-and its premise
that state courts are not, as  a constitutional matter, adequate substi-
tutes  for article  III  courts--would  make judges  more reluctant  to
narrow federal jurisdiction.
I do  not discount that  possibility,  but it still seems  to  me  that
Amar's  effort  to  link the  two questions  is ultimately  unhelpful.  To
begin with, the connection is not a necessary one.  Martin Redish and
Paul Bator, for example, share the traditionalist view of article 111,225
but  hold  widely  different  views  about  the  appropriate  scope  and
interpretation  of  congressional  grants  of  federal  court
jurisdiction.226
Moreover,  the link that Amar tries to forge is not clearly desira-
ble.  For it is not only strong nationalists  like Amar who might view
the two issues as related.  Aside from the dictum in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,22 7  Supreme  Court  decisions  almost  uniformly  suggest  (also
often in dictum) that Congress's power to restrict federal court juris-
diction is unlimited, 2 2 '  and there is little reason to expect an about-
223  401 U.S.  37, 43-54  (1971).
224  See Fallon, supra note  215, at 1251.
225  See Bator, supra note 2, at  1030; Redish, Power to Regulate, supra note 2, at 927.
226  Compare Bator, Some Thoughts on Applied Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB.  POL'Y.
51  (1982),  Bator, Finality in Criminal  Law and  Federal  Habeas Corpus  for  State Prisoners,  76
HARV.  L. REV.  441,  509 (1963)  and Bator, supra note 66, at 622 n.49 with M.  REDISH,
FEDERALJURISDICTION:  TENSIONS  IN THE ALLOCATION  OFJUDICIAL  POWER  1-4, 337-73'
(2d ed.  1989) and Redish,  Constitutiomal Limitations, supra note 5,  at  143-61.
227  14 U.S.  (1 Wheat.) 304  (1816).
228  See, e.g.,  Palmore  v. United States, 411 U.S.  389, 400-02  (1973);  Lockerty v.
Phillips,  319 U.S.  182,  187  (1943);  Kline  v.  Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S.  226,
234  (1922);  Exparte McCardle,  74 U.S.  (7 Wall.)  506, 513-14 (1868);  Cary v.  Curtis,
44 U.S.  (3 How.)  236,  245 (1845).
Amar's claim that major Marshall Court opinions support his thesis seems to me
a bit strained.  See  Amar, supra note  6,  at  1513  n.37.  The  passage he  cites  fromHISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE 1I  1
face from  the Supreme Court of the  1990s.  Under Amar's  holistic
approach, a judge who believes Congress has unlimited power under
article III to assign final adjudication of all cases to the state courts
might also treat state and federal courts as equivalents when interpret-
ing  congressional grants of federal jurisdiction.  Such  an  approach,  I
believe, would be not simply mistaken but potentially quite harmful.
Though  surely a congressional  grant of federal  court jurisdic-
tion should establish  a strong "principle of preference"  favoring its
exercise,229  when  hard  questions  of interpretation  and application
invariably  arise, the invocation  of disparity  offers little guidance  in
resolving those questions.  Indeed, so long as Supreme Court review
of state  courts  exists,  the very  decision  by  Congress  to  grant any
jurisdiction  to the lower federal courts ordinarily rests on a belief in
disparity.  For if the federal courts did not promise something differ-
Osborn  v.  Bank  of the  United  States,  22  U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  738,  821-22  (1824),
suggests that federal question jurisdiction was of particular importance, but does not
suggest that it (much  less the  admiralty or ambassador jurisdiction)  is mandatory.
The passage from Cohens  v. Virginia,  19 U.S.  (6 Wheat.)  264,  378  (1821),  merely
classifies  article  III's  heads  of jurisdiction  into  two  groups,  those  based  on  the
character  of the cause and those based on the character of the parties.  There  is no
reference  to  the  word  "all,"  nor  any  suggestion  that  any portion  of article  III  is
mandatory.
For discussion  of Amar's  reliance  on John Marshall's  extra-judicial  defense  of
McCulloch v. Maryland,  17 U.S.  (4 Wheat)  400 (1819),  see supra text accompanying
notes 77-81.
From the Taney Court, Amar cites Rhode  Island v.  Massachusetts,  37  U.S.  (12
Pet.)  657  (1838).  See  Amar,  supra  note  6,  at  1513  n.37.  There,  counsel  for
Massachusetts  (the defendant) contended that the Supreme Court was not obligated
to  exercise  original jurisdiction, as  article III's description  of the jurisdiction  over
suits between states was not modified by the word "all."  See Rhode Island, 37 U.S.  (12
Pet.)  at 672-73.  Justice Baldwin  acknowledged  but  gave  little weight  to  counsel's
suggestion:  "[Tihough  the constitution does not, in terms, extend the judicial power
to  all  controversies  between  two  or  more  states,  yet  it  in  terms  excludes  none,
whatever may be their nature or subject."  Id. at 721.
Baldwin  proceeded  to  discuss  the  Supreme  Court's  original jurisdiction,  and
then  observed  that Congress  may  distribute  the  "residue"  between  the  Supreme
Court and the inferior courts, "which it was bound to ordain and establish." Id. The
language  could  (but need not) be read  to suggest that the judicial  power must be
vested in some federal court, but Baldwin does not distinguish between Amar's two
tiers.  And this ambiguous  dictum seems particularly weak support for Amar in view
of Baldwin's  fundamentally  mistaken  belief that  Congress  must  establish  inferior
federal  courts.
Amar chooses  his words carefully when he says,  in his reply, that none of these
cases  "in  any  way  criticizes  or  challenges"  the  mandatory/permissive  distinction
articulated  in Martin. Amar, Reply, supra note 9,  at  1666.  As phrased,  the point is
correct.  It  is  also  true,  however,  that  these  cases  do  not  endorse  or  even
acknowledge a mandatory/permissive  distinction.
229  See  Shapiro,  supra note  216,  at  547  (quoting  Friendly,  Indiscretion About
Discretion, 31  EMoRY  L.J. 747,  768 (1982)).
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ent from (and preferable to) state court adjudication, there would be
little  point  in  creating  the  added  complexity  that  dual  systems  of
jurisdiction  entail.230  But  it  hardly  follows  from  that  observation
that  whenever  a  difficult  jurisdictional  question  is  presented,  the
right answer  is  that federal  court jurisdiction  should be exercised.
Rather, in resolving such questions,  context matters, both temporal
and procedural. I will offer two brief illustrations.
The first  compares the federal courts' role in constitutional liti-
gation before  1937 with their role since  1954. It may be that lower
federal court judges embraced  the Supreme Court's substantive due
process  decisions of the early  1900s more enthusiastically  than did
their  state  court  counterparts.  Certainly  that  perception 231  influ-
enced  the  enactment of the Norris  LaGuardia  Act,232  the Johnson
Act of 1934,233 and the Tax Injunction Act of 1937.234  Only the first
of these statutes even arguably would raise a constitutional question
under Amar's  thesis,235  but Congress might well have thought, as a
matter of subconstitutional policy, that state court decisionmaking in
these  areas  was  preferable  to federal  court decisionmaking.  Given
that background,  the Supreme Court may have thought it appropri-
ate to  narrowly  construe federal jurisdiction over these  matters.236
By  contrast, I  think  it doubtful  that Brown v. Board of Education23 7
could have been meaningfully  enforced had Congress restricted  the
availability of lower federal court jurisdiction over school desegrega-
tion suits.  Here, too, Congress (and the courts) might have thought
disparity to be considerable, but in this case to call for the very broad
230  There is one other possible reason for federal court jurisdiction: a belief that
a dual system  may lead to a healthy competition between state and federal judges.  I
doubt that most grants of federal jurisdiction, and in particular the federal question
jurisdiction, rest primarily on that premise.
231  See,  e.g.,  F.  FRANKFURTER  &  N.  GREENE,  THE  LABOR  INJUNCTION  212-20
(1930); Gunther, supra note 2, at 919-20; see also S. REP. No. 125, 73d Cong., Ist Sess.
4-5, 8-9  (1933)  (Johnson Act);  S.  REP. No.  1035,  75th  Cong.,  1st Sess.  1-2  (1937)
(Tax Injunction Act  modeled on Johnson Act).
232  47 Star.  70  (1932)  (codified  as  amended at  29  U.S.C.  §§  101-15  (1982  &
Supp. V  1987)).
233  48 Star.  775 (codified at 28  U.S.C.  § 1342  (1982)).
234  50 Stat.  738 (codified as amended  at 28 U.S.C.  § 1341  (1982)).
235  See supra note 211  and accompanying  text.
236  See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S.  293, 298-301
(1943)  (under  principles  of  comity,  federal  court  should  not  issue  declaratory
judgment, whose practical  effect would be the same as a prohibited injunction,  where
state remedies  are  adequate);  California  v.  Grace  Brethren  Church, 457  U.S.  393,
407-19  (1982)  (interpreting the Tax Injunction Act  itself as barring such relief).
237  347 U.S.  483 (1954).HISTORY AND  STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE  III
exercise of federal jurisdiction.23   Thus, the mere invocation of dis-
parity  does  not  provide  a  satisfactory  guide  for  Congress  or  the
courts.
My second example is more specific, relating to the Younger doc-
trine.  In my view, a defendant in a pending state court criminal pro-
ceeding  should not be barred from  obtaining federal  interlocutory
relief from additional future prosecutions,  providing, of course, that
the requisites for an interlocutory injunction are satisfied.  This form
of prospective relief promotes extremely  important policies,  is  not
available in the state prosecution itself, and can (though need not) be
tailored to limit interference with state court proceedings.239  Thus, I
think the Court erred in Doran v.  Salem Inn, Inc.240  in declining,  in
such  a  case,  to  exercise  the  presumptively  available  federal  court
jurisdiction over civil rights actions under 42  U.S.C.  § 1983.
By  contrast, I think it would be a mistake  for a federal district
court  to  exercise jurisdiction  over a  civil  rights  action in which  a
defendant  in  a  pending  state  prosecution  raised  federal  constitu-
tional objections  to  the grand jury's racial  composition,  to  the jury
instructions on burden of proof, or to the introduction of particular
evidence. The availability of such relief is far more intrusive, particu-
larly  given  the  number  of constitutional  issues  that  can  arise  in a
criminal  trial, and state court resolution of those issues provides ade-
quate  relief for  constitutional  violations.  Thus,  I  approve  of the
Court's decisions limiting federal jurisdiction in such cases,241  even
238  Indeed,  some  important  decisions  broadly  construing  federal  court
jurisdiction occurred in this context.  See, e.g.,  Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.  267,  289
(1977)  (broadly construing the scope  of permissible  "prospective  injunctive  relief"
under  the  eleventh  amendment);  McNeese  v.  Board of Educ.,  373  U.S.  668,  671
(1963)  (refusing to require exhaustion of state administrative remedies  before resort
to federal court  under 42  U.S.C.  § 1983);  cf  Mayor of Philadelphia  v. Educational
Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 628 (1974) (abstention disfavored in equal protection
suits).  In  addition,  other  cases  broadly  expanded  the  scope  of  federal  equity
jurisdiction, both in approving structural injunctions to desegregate  school systems,
see, e.g.,  Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S.  1, 17  (1971), and
in other respects, see, e.g.,  United  States v. Hall,  472 F.2d  261,  262  (5th Cir.  1972);
Griffin v. County School Bd.,  363 F.2d 206, 212  (4th Cir. 1966),  cert. denied, 385 U.S.
960 (1966).
239  For arguments supporting that position, see  HART & WECHSLER,  supra note
2, at 1420-24;  Laycock, Federal  Interference  with State Prosecutions: The Need  for  Prospective
Relief  1977 Sup.  CT.  REv.  193,  202-14.
240  422  U.S.  922  (1975).
241  See, e.g.,  Cleary v. Bolger, 371  U.S. 392 (1963); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S.
117  (1951).  I  should  add  that  my  position  is  not  premised  on  the  possible
availability,  after the conclusion of state court proceedings, of federal  habeas corpus
relief, and that in some instances habeas relief may in fact not be available.  See, e.g.,
Teague  v.  Lane,  109  S. Ct.  1060,  1077-78  (1989)  (ordinarily  no habeas  relief for
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assuming (as I do) that federal courts were, and still are, on average,
more  receptive  than state courts  to claims  of federal  constitutional
right.
242
There  is no reason  to think that state and federal  courts are  on
more of a par in  the second  situation  than the first.  The point is,
simply,  that  general  propositions  about  parity  do  not  decide  con-
crete cases.
"novel"  constitutional  claims);  Stone  v.  Powell,  428  U.S.  465,  481-82  (1976)
(ordinarily  no  habeas  relief  for  Fourth  amendment  claims);  28  U.S.C.  § 2241(c)
(1982)  (habeas petitioner must be  in custody).
242  See  Meltzer,  supra note  220,  at  1231-33;  see  also  Meltzer,  The Judiciary's
Bicentennial, 56 U.  CI.  L.  REv. 423,  425-6  (1989).
For general discussion of "parity,"  see Chemerinsky, Parity  Reconsidered: Defining  a
Role for the Federal  Judiciary, 36  UCLA  L.  REV.  233,  236  (1988)  (calling the  parity
debate unresolvable because it is an empirical question without an empirical answer);
Neuborne, supra note 219, at  1105 (arguing that "the assumption of parity is, at best,
a  dangerous  myth");  Solimine  & 'Walker,  Constitutional  Litigation in Federal and State
Courts: An  Empirical Analysis ofJudicial Parity, 10  HASTINGS  CONST.  L.Q. 213,  214-15
(1983)  (arguing that state courts are not hostile to federal claims and that parity does
exist); Solimine & Walker, State Court Protection of  Federal  Constitutional  Rights, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB.  POL'Y  127 (1989);  see also Wells, Is Disparity  a Problem, 22 GA.  L.  REv. 283,
301,  335-6  (1988)  (suggesting that  state courts are less  likely than federal  courts to
uphold claims of individual right, but that difference in performance does not always
justify arguments  for federal jurisdiction).